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This dissertation comprises three essays in economics. They concern two 
topics: intertemporal choices and belief change. All of the three essays make use 
of experimental methods.  
Many economic decisions involve outcomes at different points in time. Kids 
decide how to finish a jar of sweets over a month. Senior students decide whether 
to study in a graduate program or to work. Employees decide how much to invest 
in pension accounts. Typical questions faced by those decision-makers are 
whether they want a smaller sooner reward or a larger later reward, and whether 
they want a big reward at a time or small rewards over a period of time.  
Economic experiments on intertemporal choices often start from choices 
between monetary rewards. A prediction of the standard consumption-savings 
model is that people should always discount small (compared to lifelong wealth) 
monetary rewards at the market interest rate. However, in almost all experiments 
the majority of subjects do not behave in that way. Therefore, it is still interesting 
to know how people make intertemporal choices over monetary rewards.  
In Chapter 2, my coauthor and I investigate one aspect of the topic: how 
choices change with the size of outcomes, usually called the magnitude effect. 
The magnitude effect is an established pattern of intertemporal choices, dating 
back to Thaler (1981), but most studies only looked at choices between single 
dated rewards, such as choosing between receiving €20 tomorrow and receiving 
€30 in five months. As a result, we only knew the magnitude effect as a whole. 
But most economic decisions involve a more general case: choices between 
intertemporal profiles, such as choosing between receiving €20 tomorrow and 
€20 in five months and receiving €28 tomorrow and €10 in five months. To 
predict how such choices change with the size of outcomes, we need knowledge 
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about channels of the magnitude effect: when outcomes are larger, whether 
people are more patient, and whether rewards at different points in time are more 
fungible.  
In order to examine channels of the magnitude effect, we use the Convex Time 
Budget method introduced by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). The method 
requires subjects to allocate a total budget into two dates, given an interest rate 
for money allocated to the later date. The method allows us to estimate the 
discount rate and the utility curvature simultaneously, and hence we are able to 
disentangle the magnitude effect into two channels.  
We find a significant magnitude effect in intertemporal allocation tasks: the 
budget share allocated to the later date increases with the size of the budget. This 
effect does not depend on whether the sooner reward is paid in the present or in 
the future, implying that the factors which drive the present bias cannot fully 
account for the magnitude effect. At the aggregate level as well as at the 
individual level, we find magnitude effects both on the discount rate and on 
intertemporal substitutability (i.e. utility curvature). The latter effect is consistent 
with theories in which the degree of asset integration is increasing in the stake.  
Chapter 3 is motivated by a question raised during the writing of Chapter 2. 
The CTB method used in Chapter 2 requires parametric assumptions of the utility 
function being measured, and hence our decomposition of the magnitude effect 
also relies on parametric assumptions. Though we have checked a few popular 
specifications showing the robustness of our results, I was always asking a 
question: is it possible to study the magnitude effect (and other aspects of 
intertemporal choices) in a completely parameter-free way?  
In Chapter 3, I develop a simple method for measuring intertemporal 
preferences: directly measuring preferences over intertemporal profiles. The 
method is parameter-free and independent of time horizon effects, and hence 




discount function. It requires weak assumptions on preferences to be measured, 
and hence can be used to test a wide range of models.  
By applying the method, I test eight models of intertemporal choices. Those 
models provide different predictions on two properties of preferences: how 
choices change with the stake (the magnitude effect), and whether people are 
overly impatient when it is possible to have all money on the earlies date (the all-
sooner effect).  
Regarding the magnitude effect, I find that utility curvature is smaller for 
higher stakes, but no evidence shows that (generalized) discount factors change 
with the stake. Regarding the all-sooner effect, I do find evidence that people are 
overly impatient when a pure sooner reward is available. I then propose a simple 
model which captures these two effects to facilitate parametric estimation in 
future studies.  
The other topic of this dissertation is belief change. In economic theories, when 
uncertainty is present, choices are based on beliefs, but do choices in turn have 
an effect on subsequent belief formation? For instance, John chooses yoghurt 
over ice cream because he believes that the health benefits of yoghurt over ice 
cream overweighs its disadvantage in deliciousness. Does this choice per se 
(rather than new information obtained from eating the yoghurt or from reading 
health magazines) make John more believe in a large health benefit of yoghurt?  
I address this question in Chapter 4. I perform an experiment to study choice-
induced belief change in an individual decision-making context. After being 
presented with noisy signals about the values of two options, subjects are 
randomly assigned to one of the three treatments: making a choice between the 
two options, receiving a random option, or possessing no option. Then they are 
presented with more signals and are asked to estimate the values of the two 
options.  
I find no significant differences between the distributions of estimates in the 
three groups, irrespective of whether belief elicitation is incentivized or not, and 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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irrespective of whether previous signals are perfectly accessible or not. This 
suggests that making a choice does not lead to an economically meaningful effect 





2 MAGNITUDE EFFECT IN 
INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION TASKS 
The prediction of the standard consumption-saving model, that people always 
discount an income at the market interest rate, has been found to be inconsistent 
with empirical results.1 One important anomaly, dating back to Thaler (1981), is 
the magnitude effect: people appear less patient when choosing among smaller 
rewards than when choosing among larger rewards. A deeper understanding of 
this anomaly will help to lay a more solid foundation for the research of 
intertemporal choice and related applications.  
In this paper, we investigate whether the magnitude effect on time preferences 
can be observed in intertemporal allocation tasks, and if so, whether the 
magnitudes impact intertemporal preferences through the present bias, the 
discount rate or the atemporal utility function.  
Different channels of the magnitude effect have different implications for 
choices in intertemporal allocation tasks. If the discount rate is smaller for larger 
outcomes, when the total budget increases, people will appear more patient in all 
choices. If the utility curvature is smaller for larger outcomes, when the total 
budget increases, choices will be more sensitive to interest rates. If the present 
bias is smaller for larger outcomes, when the total budget increases, choices made 
between today and a future date will be less different from choices made between 
two future dates.  
Several experiments on time preferences have reported a magnitude effect.2 
Though most early studies are based on hypothetical decisions, there are also 
some real-stake experiments that found a magnitude effect (Holcomb and Nelson, 
                                                        
1 To be more precise, people discount at the market rate unless the borrowing constraint is binding.  
2 Frederick et al. (2002, Section 4.2.2) summarized the early literature on the magnitude effect of time 
preferences. Andersen et al. (2011) also reviewed the more recent literature. 
Chapter 2. Magnitude Effect in Intertemporal Allocation Tasks 
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1992; Kirby, 1997; Kirby, Petry and Bickel, 1999; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström, 2013; Halevy, 2015). In this literature, little efforts are made to explore 
the channels of the magnitude effect. This is mainly because most studies 
employed a single-reward task, in which a subject can only get one reward, either 
on a sooner date or on a later date. With a single-reward task, one cannot 
disentangle different channels and can only attribute all effects to one aggregate 
measure, the monetary discount rate.  
We are interested in the following question: Is the magnitude effect mainly 
driven by the factors which drive the present bias, does the magnitude affect 
choices through the long-run discount rate, or does it affect choices through 
intertemporal substitutability (utility curvature)? To disentangle these channels is 
interesting for at least two reasons. First, the knowledge about how the stake 
affects intertemporal choices in different ways is important for establishing 
deeper and better-founded descriptive theories of intertemporal decision making. 
Second, omitting a channel of the magnitude effect in an empirical study or in 
policy making may lead to misspecified models and biased estimates and 
predictions. 
We employ the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method introduced by Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012). It allows subjects to form a portfolio of a sooner reward and 
a later reward given a budget constraint. The possibility for subjects to make 
interior choices (and not only corner choices as in most binary choice tasks) 
enables the researcher to simultaneously identify the discount rate and the 
intertemporal substitutability.3  
                                                        
3  Abdellaoui et al. (2013a) provided another method for measuring intertemporal preferences 
parametrically. Their method identifies utility curvature from marginal utilities for different quantities on 
the same date, while the CTB method identifies utility curvature from sensitivities of choices to interest 
rates. They are equivalent if the true model is with a stationary period utility function and a magnitude-
independent discount function, as assumed in our paper. If the condition is not satisfied, the former method 
is better at measuring curvature of a period utility function, and the CTB method is better at measuring 
sensitivity of choices to interest rates (or elasticity of intertemporal substitution). A discussion about the 




The design of our experiment has three main features. First, all subjects receive 
equal amounts of participation fees on the sooner date and on the later date 
regardless of their choices, and the payment conditions are constant across time. 
Thus, the transaction costs and the trustworthiness of the payments are equalized 
across periods, and these confounding factors are controlled for. Second, we 
implement two treatments. In one treatment subjects allocate between today and 
four weeks later, while in the other treatment subjects allocate between four 
weeks later and eight weeks later. This allows us to assess whether the magnitude 
effect is driven by the same factors that drive the present bias. Finally, by 
assuming a simple yet popular model, the CTB method allows us to identify the 
discount rate and the atemporal utility function simultaneously. As a result, we 
are able to disentangle the channels of the magnitude effect.  
We find evidence of the magnitude effect, irrespective of whether or not a 
front-end delay is present, suggesting that the factor which drives the present bias 
cannot fully explain the magnitude effect. The magnitude effect is decreasing in 
the magnitude. At the aggregate level as well as at the individual level, we find 
magnitude effects both on the discount rate and on intertemporal substitutability. 
Both channels have considerable impacts on predicted choices. We find that the 
latter effect is not the same as the magnitude effect on risk attitudes found in 
previous studies, and hence it might be problematic to correct for the curvature 
of utility functions by risk attitudes.  
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: We introduce our 
experimental design in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we formulate our hypotheses. 
In Section 2.3, we investigate non-parametrically the magnitude effect and its 
relation with the present bias. We explore the channels by parametric estimation 
both at the aggregate level and at the individual level in Section 2.4. In Section 
2.5, we discuss the interpretations of our findings. We draw conclusions in 
Section 2.6.  
 
Chapter 2. Magnitude Effect in Intertemporal Allocation Tasks 
8 
 
2.1 Experimental Design 
2.1.1 The Convex Time Budget Method, Parameters and 
Implementation 
The foundation of our experimental design is the Convex Time Budget method 
introduced by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). The method consists of a set of 
intertemporal allocation tasks: in each decision subjects are asked to allocate 𝑁 
tokens to two dates, 𝑡 days from today and (𝑡 + 𝜏) days from today. Each 
token allocated to 𝑡 is worth 𝑃𝑡 euro, while each token allocated to (𝑡 + 𝜏) is 
worth 𝑃𝑡+𝜏 euro. Suppose a subject allocates 𝑛𝑡 tokens to the sooner date and 
𝑛𝑡+𝜏 to the later date, the amount of the sooner reward will be 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑛𝑡 euro 
and the amount of the later reward will be 𝑧𝑡+𝜏 = 𝑃𝑡+𝜏 ∙ 𝑛𝑡+𝜏 euro.  
Choices are subject to the budget constraint, 𝑛𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡+𝜏 ≤ 𝑁 , and the non-
negativity constraints, 0 ≤ 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑛𝑡+𝜏 ≤ 𝑁. They are told that they can allocate any 
number of tokens they like to one of the two dates. Examples of both corner 
choices and interior choices are given to remove any hesitation in making either 
type of choices. 
Decisions with the same total budget, 𝑁, are grouped in one decision form, 
which is displayed on one page. There are seven decisions in one decision form. 
The return to each token allocated to the later date is fixed as 𝑃𝑡+𝜏 = €0.20, 
while the return to each token allocated to the sooner date is varied and takes the 
values 𝑃𝑡 = €0.20, €0.19, €0.18, €0.17, €0.16, €0.15, and €0.14. Hence, those 
decisions imply seven gross interest rates, 𝑅 =1, 1.05, 1.11, 1.18, 1.25, 1.33, and 
1.43, respectively, over a period of 𝜏 days. The constraints can be rewritten as  
𝑅 ∙ 𝑧𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡+𝜏 ≤ 𝑚 
𝑧𝑡, 𝑧𝑡+𝜏 ≥ 0 
where 𝑚 is the total budget and 𝑚 = 𝑃𝑡+𝜏 ∙ 𝑁.  
2.1. Experimental Design 
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We implement the CTB method by a zTree program (Fischbacher 2007). 
Figure 2.1 shows the interface of a typical decision form. Each decision takes a 
row. Decisions can be made by scrolling the bars. Once an adjustment is made 
for one decision, the amounts of the sooner reward and of the later reward in that 
decision are automatically calculated and displayed.  
To avoid any possible effects of initial values, the amounts of rewards are 
initially blank. Decisions cannot be submitted until all the scrollbars have been 
adjusted at least once.  
2.1.2 Procedures 
There are two parts in our experiment. Part I consists of five decision forms, 
with 𝑁 =100, 200, 300, 400, and 800. The order is randomly drawn for each 
subject. Subjects can move to a specific decision form by clicking the button with 
the corresponding number. One can go to any decision form at any time, 
regardless of whether the current decision form is completed. Decisions are 
automatically stored when one switches to another decision form. This makes 
comparisons across magnitudes very easy to the subjects in case they would want 
to make such comparisons. Decisions can only be submitted when all the 35 
decisions in the five decision forms are completed.  
We randomly assign subjects to one of two treatment groups. In the Present 
Group, the sooner date is today while the later date is four weeks from today, i.e. 
𝑡 = 0 and 𝜏 = 28. In the Delayed Group, the sooner date is four weeks from 
today while the later date is eight weeks from today, i.e. 𝑡 = 28 and 𝜏 = 28. 
Comparing the two groups enables us to check if there exists a present bias on 
average, and more importantly, if there exists a magnitude effect when no rewards 
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Part II is composed of an extended CTB decision form with seven decisions. 
Subjects are asked to allocate 400 tokens to three dates, today, four weeks from 
today and eight weeks from today. One additional restriction is imposed, 
depending on which group one is in. A subject in the Present Group can allocate 
either 0 or 200 tokens to eight weeks from today; she cannot choose other 
numbers. But she is still free to allocate any number of tokens between today and 
four weeks from today. Similarly, a subject in the Delayed Group can allocate 
either 200 or 400 tokens to today. She is still free to allocate any number of tokens 
(if there remains some) between four weeks from today and eight weeks from 
today. The restrictions and the returns to one token allocated are shown in Table 
2.1.  
Table 2.1: Restrictions on the Number of Tokens and Returns to One Token Allocated to 
a Specific Date in Part II 
 
The additional date (eight weeks from today for the Present Group or today for 
the Delayed Group) is accompanied with a very high return for the Present Group 
and a very low return for the Delayed Group, so that subjects are induced to 
Group  Today 
Four weeks from 
today 
Eight weeks from 
today 
Present 








the number of 
tokens 
No restriction No restriction 0 or 200 
Delayed 









the number of 
tokens 
200 or 400 No restriction No restriction 
Chapter 2. Magnitude Effect in Intertemporal Allocation Tasks 
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allocate 200 tokens to this additional date.4 If they do so, the remaining task is 
equivalent to the one with a total budget of 200 tokens in Part I. This characteristic 
makes the two decision forms comparable.  
The purpose of Part II is to test the time separability of intertemporal 
preferences. One alternative hypothesis is that a subject in the Delayed Group 
may allocate less to the sooner date if she has allocated a large amount of money 
to an even sooner date, since the desire for extra consumption has already been 
partly satisfied. A similar hypothesis applies to the Present Group: a subject in 
the Present Group may allocate less to the later date if she has already allocated 
a large amount of money to an even later date, since the guilt for not saving has 
been partly released. If preferences are time non-separable, the use of a model 
with a time separable preference is more likely to be problematic. Thus, we want 
to test the hypothesis of time separability before we perform parametric 
estimation with a time-separable model.  
We do not directly give a fixed reward on the additional date. This is because 
a fixed reward might be mentally isolated from the allocation task due to narrow 
bracketing, and hence the test of time separability in the allocation task may be 
invalid.  
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to finish a questionnaire. As 
in previous studies with the CTB method, we asked about subjects’ typical 
expenditures in one week. The average response was €55.22 per week or €7.89 
per day.  
2.1.3 Experimental Payments 
The payments are composed of two parts. First, all subjects receive a €5 
participation fee on each of the two dates scheduled in Part I. Second, each 
subject has a 10% chance to receive earnings from decisions. Before the 
                                                        
4 In fact, only nine out of 203 subjects selected a different number than 200 to the additional date, 
which involved 41 (2.9%) out of 1415 decisions.  
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experiment starts, each subject is randomly given a lottery number, ranging from 
0 to 9. After all subjects in a session finish the questionnaire, the experimenter 
invites one of the subjects to draw a ten-sided die in front of all subjects in the 
session. Subjects who have a lottery number that equals the die roll get the 
earnings from decisions. One decision is randomly selected from the 42 decisions 
in the two parts as the decision that counts.  If the decision that counts is from 
Part I, the allocation in that decision will be realized as the earnings from 
decisions. If the decision that counts is from Part II, the allocation will be realized 
and the subject will also receive a €5 participation fee on the additional date in 
Part II; hence a subject will receive three participation fees if a decision in Part II 
is realized. All the rules above were articulated in the instruction, and the 
instructions were always read aloud before either part of the experiment.  
The earnings were paid by bank transfer to subjects’ checking accounts. We 
made orders of transfers soon after the experiment and sent reminder emails with 
information about the incoming amounts on the experimental day and on all the 
payment dates. Given the reliability of the banking service, subjects can expect 
to receive all delayed payments exactly on the appropriate payment dates, while 
some of the present payments might be received one day after the experimental 
day due to the inter-bank processing.  
We believe the payment tool we used was as good as cash in terms of liquidity. 
Checking accounts are used in private transactions such as paying for rents. 
Checking accounts are also linked to debit cards. In the Netherlands, debit cards 
are widely used for daily transactions in almost all kinds of stores including 
supermarkets, university restaurants and bookstores without any transaction fees. 
We held a survey about subjects’ use of debit cards in the questionnaire. The 
responses show that bank transfers give high liquidity to the rewards, so that no 
isolation effect should be expected due to the payment method.5 
                                                        
5 84.7% of the subjects pay at least 50% of their expenditure in general by debit card, while 91.1% pay 
at least 30% of their expenditure in general by debit card. Among those who pay less than 30% of their 
expenditure in general by debit card, 61.1% pay at least 30% of their expenditure in university restaurants 
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2.1.4 Transaction Costs and Credibility of Payments 
For our experiment, it is extremely important to equalize the transaction costs 
and the trustworthiness of the payments across periods because a difference in 
the transaction costs over the two periods can be a confounding factor of the 
magnitude effect.  
Several facilities were employed in order to equalize the transaction costs 
across periods and to increase the credibility of the payments. The transaction 
costs include the costs to collect rewards, to confirm that the rewards have been 
received with correct amounts, and to remember the earnings so that they can be 
consumed on the expected dates.  
First, we sent reminder emails with information about the incoming amounts 
on the experimental day and on all the payment dates. Subjects knew this from 
the instruction, so they did not need to worry about forgetting the earnings on the 
payment dates, a situation in which the expected marginal utility of the delayed 
rewards might be lowered.  
Second, as Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) did, we delivered our business card 
and told the subjects to contact us immediately in case they would not receive a 
payment on time. It increased the credibility of payments and meanwhile served 
as a reminder of the payments.  
Third, we asked subjects to fill in a payment reminder card with the amounts 
of their rewards on the corresponding dates just after their earnings were 
displayed. This served as a second reminder in case they forget to check emails.   
In sum, the characteristics that one will receive a participation fee on each 
payment date and that all payments will be received by bank transfer help 
equalize the transaction costs of receiving payments on all dates. At the same time, 
the business cards, the payments reminder cards and the reminder emails reduced 
the risk of forgetting the rewards. The business cards also lowered the perceived 
                                                        
or in supermarkets by debit card. Among the remaining seven subjects, four withdraw cash at least 3 times 




default risks. Even though the risk might still be perceived by some subjects, it 
should be equal across periods since the payment tools and all auxiliary facilities 
were the same.  
2.1.5 Sample 
Our experiment was conducted at the CentERlab, Tilburg University in 
September of 2014.6 203 students of the university participated in one of the 11 
sessions, 94 in the Present Group and 109 in the Delayed Group. Each subject 
made 42 decisions. One session took one hour and ten minutes on average. 22 
subjects got the earnings from decisions, which averaged €69.16. The overall 
average earning was €17.49.  
2.2 Hypotheses 
The focus of this paper is on whether there is a magnitude effect on time 
preference, i.e. if people make intertemporal choices differently when the stakes 
vary. However, the definition of the magnitude effect still needs to be clarified.  
In single-reward tasks, subjects reveal an indifference relation between a 
smaller sooner reward and a larger later reward, i.e. (𝑚𝑡, 𝑡)~(𝑚𝑡+𝜏, 𝑡 + 𝜏). A 






− 1 where 𝑚𝑡 and 
𝑚𝑡+𝜏 are revealed from the indifference relation. In this situation, the magnitude 
effect on time preference is defined on the monetary discount rate. A common 
result of such studies is that the monetary discount rate is decreasing in the stake, 
i.e. the monetary discount factor is increasing in the stake, which can be called as 
a positive magnitude effect on the monetary discount rate.  
                                                        
6  The payment dates were in September, October and November. The fall semester in Tilburg 
University started from the end of August and ended in early December. Hence the payment dates were 
earlier than the final exam weeks and the Christmas vocation, which keeps our experiment from their 
probably large impacts on the subjects’ demand of money.  
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In our intertemporal allocation task, the monetary discount rate cannot be 
defined, unless a subject always puts all the tokens onto one of the two dates. 
Therefore, the magnitude effect needs to be redefined. A natural way is to define 







) is increasing in the size of the total budget (𝑚), we call this a 
positive magnitude effect on budget share. The intuition is that when outcomes 
are scaled up, people are willing to postpone part of the sooner reward to the later 
date.7 Formally, we test the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1 (magnitude effect on budget share): 
𝑧𝑡+𝜏
𝑚 
 is increasing in 𝑚.  
This hypothesis can be tested without assuming a specific model.  
We are also interested in the relationship between the present bias and the 
magnitude effect. Benhabib et al. (2010) suggest that a fixed cost of delaying 
rewards can account for the present bias and the magnitude effect on monetary 
discount rates simultaneously, since the fixed cost induces the decision weight of 
future rewards to change disproportionately with delay and with the size of 
rewards. We would like to know if this cost is incurred only when a present 
reward is delayed or if it also applies to delaying a future reward. In a broader 
sense, we test whether the factors that drive the present bias (of which a fixed 
cost of delaying present rewards is an example) can account for the magnitude 
effect. If so, we should observe a magnitude effect in the Present Group, but not 
in the Delayed Group. If we do not observe a magnitude effect, or if we observe 
that the magnitude effects are of the same size in both groups, then it implies that 
the factors which drive the present bias cannot fully explain the magnitude effect. 
Thus, we establish our second hypothesis. 
                                                        
7 The magnitude effect on the budget share requires the overall utility function not to be homogeneous. 
It can be with a stationary period utility function and a magnitude-independent discount rate. One example 
is the preference represented by 𝑧𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡
0.5 + 0.9(𝑧𝑡+𝜏 + 𝑧𝑡+𝜏
0.5 ), where 𝑧𝑡 is a sooner reward and 𝑧𝑡+𝜏 is a 




Hypothesis 2 (no present reward, no magnitude effect): 
𝑧𝑡+𝜏
𝑚 
 does not change 
with 𝑚 in the Delayed Group.  
Conditional on finding a positive magnitude effect, we wish to explore the 
channels of the magnitude effect. Given the evidence of time separability, we will 
estimate the parameters of preferences, with the assumption that subjects 
maximize a time separable utility function with CRRA atemporal utility functions 
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, i.e. subjects maximize 
where 𝛽 is the present bias parameter, 𝛿 is the daily discount factor, 𝛼 is the 
exponent parameter. 𝑧𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡+𝜏 are the sooner reward and the later reward, 
respectively. 𝜔 is the background consumption mentally integrated with the 
experimental reward when the decision is made.  
When the CRRA utility function is assumed, the elasticity of intertemporal 









 , is equal to 
1
1−𝛼
 (𝑐𝑡 and 𝑐𝑡+𝜏 
are the consumption on the sooner date and on the later date, respectively.). Thus, 
the exponent parameter, 𝛼 , is a positive transformation of 𝑒𝑐 . If 𝛼 → 1 , the 
atemporal utility function becomes linear, and the elasticity goes to infinity. In 
that case, subjects just go for the largest present value, and hence rewards are 
perfectly substitutable between dates. In case 𝛼 → −∞ , the atemporal utility 
function is Leontief, and the elasticity goes to zero. In that case, subjects always 
divide the total budget into two equal amounts. In general, the larger the value of 
𝛼, the more substitutable the subject considers the two rewards to be. Therefore, 
𝛼 is a measure of intertemporal substitutability.  
It brings several advantages to assume such a model. First, the parameters in 
this model have important economic meanings. The discount factor determines 
the average choice across interest rates and hence measures the patience of the 
subject; if a subject is more patient, she will allocate more tokens to the later date 
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for all interest rates. The intertemporal substitutability of consumption between 
different points in time relates to the dispersion of the choices across interest rates 
since it measures how sensitive the subject is to the interest rate. These behavioral 
measures are hard to estimate without assuming a model. Due to the non-
negativity constraint, choices are censored at the corners if the preference 
parameters are extreme. As a result, directly measuring the average choice (as a 
measure of 𝛿) and the dispersion of choices (as a measure of 𝛼) leads to biases. 
In contrast, the model we assume is tractable and easy to estimate. Moreover, the 
model is widely used in both theoretical and empirical applications. 8 
Given the model above, we test the following two hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 3 (magnitude effect on discount factor): 𝛿 is increasing in 𝑚. 
Hypothesis 4 (magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability): 𝛼  is 
increasing in 𝑚. 
                                                        
8 To address the concern about misspecification, in Appendix 2.C, we check the robustness of our 
results by estimating a model with the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility function and 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The HARA utility function is more flexible in the sense that it allows the 
atemporal utility function to be Increasing Relative Risk Aversion, Constant Relative Risk Aversion or 
Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion. This kind of flexibility is especially important when the magnitude is 
varied in the experiment. The results are the same. 
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2.3 Overall Effects 
2.3.1 Magnitude Effect on Budget Share 
 
Figure 2.2: Mean Budget Share on the Sooner Date in Part I 
In Figure 2.2 we plot the mean budget share allocated to the sooner date against 
the gross interest rate, 𝑅 , of each CTB decision in Part I.9 We plot separate 
points for the five magnitudes (𝑚 = €20, €40, €60, €80, €160). The budget share 
allocated to the sooner date declines with the magnitude.  
The difference seems to be larger when the interest rate is smaller but still 
positive. This is mainly due to censoring. When the interest rate is zero (𝑅 = 1) 
or highest (𝑅 = 1.43), most choices are at the corners for both smaller and larger 
magnitudes.  
                                                        
9 In our data, 72% of the choices are at corners, and 38% of our subjects only make corner choices. 
This is very close to the 70% and 37%, respectively, in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). The relationships 
between the budget shares and the interest rates are also similar.  
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Table 2.2: Mean Differences in Budget Shares on the Later Date between Magnitudes 
Notes: Mean differences in the budget shares between two consecutive magnitudes 
given a gross interest rate, 𝑅. 
To judge whether there is a significant magnitude effect, we perform 
Hotelling’s T-squared tests on the mean differences in budget shares between 
magnitudes, taking seven choices with the same interest rate as a vector (see Table 
2.3).10 The null hypothesis is that the means of choices are the same across 
magnitudes, taking into account the correlation within subject. This class of tests 
makes sense because individual heterogeneity may have made different subjects 
reveal magnitude effects on tasks with different interest rates (e.g. Subject 1 on 
Interest Rate 1 while Subject 2 on Interest Rate 2), so that the magnitude effects 
on all choices would be jointly significant, but the effect on choices with any 
single interest rate might not be significant. The results show that the magnitude 
effect is significant between the magnitudes of €20 and €40 and between any two 
non-adjacent magnitudes. These results support Hypothesis 1, which states that a 
larger share of the budget is allocated to the later date when the size of the budget 
increases.11   
                                                        
10 Hotelling’s T-squared test is asymptotically nonparametric, so it can be applied to a large sample in 
nonnormal cases.  We also perform a multivariate signed-rank test (Oja and Randles, 2004) and the results 
are basically the same: the magnitude effects are significant between the magnitudes of €20 and €40 and 
between any two non-adjacent magnitudes at least at the 10% level.  
11 In Table 2.3, statistics are reported only for four pairs of non-adjacent magnitudes. The mean 
differences for the other three pairs of non-adjacent magnitudes (in the two groups separately and in total) 
are also significant: seven out of the nine differences are significant at the 1% level, while the other two at 
the 5% level.  
 𝑅 
 1 1.0526 1.1111 1.1765 1.25 1.3333 1.4286 
€20 ~ €40 -0.0014 0.0417 0.0613 0.0438 0.0286 0.0186 0.0096 
€40 ~ €60 0.0132 0.0157 0.0421 0.0179 0.0078 0.0053 0.0015 
€60 ~ €80 0.0027 0.0463 0.0142 0.0024 0.0041 0.0067 0.0042 
€80 ~ €160 -0.0066 0.0335 0.0008 0.0039 0.0020 -0.0076 -0.0058 
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The results also show that the differences are insignificant between adjacent 
magnitudes larger than €20. Since the allocation is monotonic in the magnitude 
and the differences are significant between non-adjacent magnitudes, the 
insignificance suggests that the magnitude effect is largest when comparing the 
smallest magnitudes (€20 and €40), and becomes smaller for larger magnitudes. 
The pattern is consistent with the fact that Andersen et al. (2013) only found a 
small magnitude effect when they elicited time preferences using very high 
stakes.12 
                                                        
12 They compare magnitudes of 1,500 Danish kroner and 3,000 Danish kroner, which is roughly 
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2.3.2 Present Bias 
Table 2.3 shows the results of the Hotelling’s T-squared tests for the Present 
Group and for the Delayed Group separately. We find significant magnitude 
effects in both groups. This implies that the presence of an immediate reward is 
not a necessary condition for the magnitude effect. In other words, the factor that 
drives the present bias is unlikely to be the driver of the magnitude effect. Thereby, 
we reject Hypothesis 2.  
We plot separate graphs for the two groups in Figure 2.3. Subjects in the 
Delayed Group seem to be slightly more patient than those in the Present Group. 
However, when we perform the Hotelling’s T-squared test on all the 35 decisions 
in Part I between groups, the null hypothesis that the two groups have the same 
mean responses is not rejected. The p-value is 0.2424 when the degree of freedom 
is (35, 167). Thus, we find no evidence of present bias.13 
Our result on the present bias and the magnitude effect is consistent with Sutter 
et al. (2013); they use binary choice lists to measure adolescents’ time preferences 
and also find evidence of the magnitude effect but no evidence of the present bias.  
Even though there might be a present bias which is not captured by our design 
due to lack of real immediate rewards, our results still have two implications for 
the magnitude effects. First, since a magnitude effect is present when the present 
bias is absent, our results imply that the factors which drive the present bias 
cannot fully account for the magnitude effect. Second, if it is a mental cost of 
delaying rewards that drives the magnitude effect (Benhabib and Bisin, 2005; 
Fudenberg and Levine, 2006), our results suggest that an equal size of mental cost 
                                                        
13 The present bias here refers to non-stationarity of preferences according to the categorization of 
Halevy (2015). Our finding does not necessarily contradict the stylized fact that the discount rate is 
decreasing in the time distance between the sooner reward and the later reward, as in Benhabib et al. (2010). 
That stylized fact and stationarity can hold simultaneously if there is subadditivity in discounting (see Read, 
2001).  
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is incurred when one postpones a future reward compared to when one postpones 
a present reward. 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean Budget Shares in the Present Group and in the Delayed Group 
2.3.3 Time Separability 
The outcomes show that Part II is a valid test of time separability, since most 
subjects chose 200 tokens for the additional date in Part II. Only 39 out of 658 
decisions from the Present Group and two out of 763 decisions from the Delayed 
Group were different from 200 tokens. Those involved eight subjects in the 
Present Group and one subject in the Delayed Group.  
After removing those decisions, we compare the choices with the magnitude 
of €40 between Part I and Part II, separately for each group. Table 2.4 shows that 
the Hotelling’s T-squared tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that responses to 
the two parts have the same means. Those results support time separability, which 




Table 2.4: Multivariate Mean Difference Tests between Part I and Part II 
Notes: Hotelling’s T-squared tests on the mean differences in the budget shares in the 
decisions with the magnitude of €40 between Part I and Part II. Subjects who chose 
a different number from 200 tokens for the additional date in Part II such that their 
choices were not comparable between the two parts have been removed from the 
sample. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
2.4 Channels 
In order to disentangle the magnitude effect into two channels, we perform 
parametric estimations both at the aggregate level and at the individual level. We 
then test if the preference parameters change with the magnitude of the total 
budget.  
2.4.1 Aggregate-Level Estimation 
2.4.1.1 Estimation strategy 
In our main specification, we assume a CRRA atemporal utility function as in 
equation (2.1). We set 𝜔  (background consumption) equal to the average 
response to the question about one’s typical daily expenditure, €7.89, as Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012) did in two of their specifications.14 
                                                        
14 To fix the background consumption across subjects brings the advantage that all effects come from 
the variation in choices rather than also from the variation in the self-reported background consumptions, 
which may be noisy. We check the robustness by setting 𝜔 as individual background consumption, and 
average/individual background consumption combined with the participation fee (See Appendix 2.B). The 
results are basically the same.  
Subsample Present Delayed Total 
F-statistic 1.5560 1.4192 1.0979 
Degree of 
freedom 
7, 79 7, 101 7, 187 
p-value 0.1609 0.2058 0.3662 
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Given the intertemporal utility function, solving the optimization problem 






𝛼−1, if 𝑡 = 0
(𝛿𝜏𝑅)
1
𝛼−1, if 𝑡 > 0
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) ∙ ln 𝑅 
where 1𝑡=0 is the indicator for the Present Group.  
The parameters to be estimated are the present bias parameter, 𝛽, the discount 
factor, 𝛿, and the CRRA curvature parameter, 𝛼. The present bias parameter is 
identified by the differences in allocation between the Present Group and the 
Delayed Group. If there is a present bias, subjects in the Present Group will 
allocate more tokens to the sooner date than those in the Delayed Group. The 
discount factor is identified by one’s average choice across different experimental 
interest rates.  A more patient subject will allocate more tokens to the later date 
in all decisions. The curvature parameter is identified by the dispersion of one’s 
choices across interest rates. Those who consider rewards highly substitutable 
over time are likely to make corner choices in all decisions, while those with 
lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution will make choices closer to equal 
splits.  
Following the practice in previous studies (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; and 
Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger, 2015), we assume a normally distributed 
error term additive to the log allocation ratio and take censoring into 

























































where 𝑖 = 1,… ,203 denotes Subject 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,… ,7 denotes Interest rate 𝑗, and 
𝑘 = 1,… ,5  denotes Magnitude 𝑘 . The error term is allowed to vary across 
magnitudes since giving a larger number of tokens might induce a larger noise, 
which might be a competing explanation of a larger sensitivity to the interest rate.  
The model is estimated by the quasi-maximum-likelihood method: when 
performing the estimation, the error term, 𝝐 , is assumed to be i.i.d., while in 
computing the standard errors, the error term is assumed to be independent across 
subjects, but might be correlated within-subject. Estimates of the parameters can 
be recovered and standard errors can be inferred by the delta method.  
Since we are interested in the magnitude effect, we also perform the estimation 
with interaction terms of the parameters and the magnitude dummies. Thus, tests 
can be performed on the differences between the parameters for different 
magnitudes.  
In Appendix 2.C, we assume another specification, in which the utility function 
is Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA). In that specification the 
background consumption, 𝜔, is also a parameter to be estimated. In this way, we 
address the concern that the average self-reported background consumption may 
not match the true background consumption integrated with the experimental 
rewards in decision making, or the Relative Risk Aversion of the utility function 
may not be constant (i.e. the CRRA utility function is misspecified). The results 
are basically the same.  




Table 2.5 reports the magnitude-invariant estimates and the magnitude-specific 
estimates of the parameters, respectively. A salient feature is that none of the 
estimates of 𝛽 is significantly different from 1, implying no evidence of present 
bias, which is consistent with our finding in the model-free analysis. The annual 
discount rate for all magnitudes is 52.7%, which is in the range found by previous 
studies. The CRRA curvature parameters are always significantly smaller than 1, 
implying that the subjects on average consider the monetary rewards received on 
different dates imperfectly substitutable, which is also consistent with other 
studies (e.g. Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger, 2013; 
Cheung, 2015; and Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger, 2015).  
Most importantly, both the discount factor and the CRRA curvature are 
increasing in the magnitude. To judge if these magnitude effects are significant, 
Table 2.6 presents Wald tests over the differences of parameters between 
magnitudes.15 We find significant magnitude effects both on the discount factor, 
𝛿, and on the exponent parameter, 𝛼, which is a positive transformation of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The discount factor is increasing in the 
magnitude, which is consistent with previous studies. The elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution is increasing in the magnitude, meaning that the 
rewards on the two dates are more substitutable to the subjects when the subjects 
face a larger total budget. This results in choices closer to the two corners (to 
which corner depends on whether 𝛿𝑅 > 1). Thereby, we verify Hypothesis 3 and 
Hypothesis 4.  
  
                                                        
15 For the other three pairs of non-adjacent magnitudes: the differences in 𝛽 are not significant, while 




Table 2.5: Discounting and Curvature Parameter Estimates in the Aggregate-Level 
Estimation with the CRRA Specification 
Notes: Two-limit Tobit estimators. CRRA estimation with 𝜔 = 7.89 (average 
reported background consumption). Column 1: assuming that parameters are 
invariant to magnitudes. Column 2-6: assuming that parameters vary with magnitudes. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Log-likelihood has been corrected for the 
transformation of dependent variables. Standard errors calculated via the delta 
method. 
  
Model: Tobit Tobit 
Magnitude: All €20 €40 €60 €80 €160 
Present bias: ?̂? 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.986 0.997 0.986 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) 
Discount factor over four 
weeks: 𝛿?̂? 
0.968 0.948 0.961 0.971 0.972 0.982 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
CRRA curvature: ?̂? 0.955 0.928 0.947 0.952 0.958 0.968 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
S.e. of the error term: ?̂? 3.699 2.294 2.986 3.369 3.857 5.314 
 (0.281) (0.200) (0.245) (0.269) (0.307) (0.454) 
Log-likelihood -13678.51 -13538.56 
Observations 7,105 7,105 
Uncensored 1,969 1,969 
Clusters 203 203 
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Table 2.6: Estimates of Parameter Differences between Magnitudes in the CRRA Specification 
Notes: Estimates of parameter differences are inferred from the Two-limit Tobit 
estimation by the delta method. The estimation assumes CRRA utility with 𝜔 =7.89. 
Separate parameters are estimated for each magnitude among €20, €40, €60, €80 and 
€160. There are 1,421 observations (203 clusters) for each magnitude. Clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors calculated via the delta method. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent 
level, respectively. 
To get an idea about the relative importance of the two channels of the 
magnitude effect, we use the estimates above to predict choices in the 35 
questions for both the Present Group and the Delayed Group. Table 2.7 presents 
the marginal effects of allowing one parameter to vary with the magnitude: in 
each row, we allow only one parameter, either 𝛿  or 𝛼 , to vary with the 
magnitude of the decisions (as indicated by the column title), but fix the other 
two parameters at the value estimated from the magnitude of €20. Each number 
in a cell is the total change (in unit of 
𝑁𝑘
100
, the percentage of the total budget) in 
the seven decisions with the corresponding magnitude. The results show that the 
marginal effect of allowing 𝛼 to vary with the magnitude is at least as large as 
the marginal effect of allowing 𝛿 to vary. This suggests that the magnitude effect 
on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is at least as important as the 
magnitude effect on the discount rate. 
Magnitude: €40 - €20 €60 - €40 €80 - €60 €160 - €80 €60 - €20 €80 - €40 €160 - €60 
Present bias: 
?̂? 
-0.000 -0.003 0.011* -0.011 -0.003 0.008 0.000 





0.014** 0.010* 0.001 0.010** 0.024*** 0.011* 0.011* 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
CRRA 
curvature: ?̂? 
0.018*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
S.e. of the 
error term: 
?̂? 
0.692*** 0.383*** 0.487*** 1.457*** 1.075*** 0.871*** 1.944*** 




Table 2.7: Marginal Effects of Allowing a Parameter to Vary with Magnitudes in the 
CRRA Specification 
Notes: The changes in choices predicted by the CRRA Tobit model using the 
parameter values indicated by the row title compared with (𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼1), for the two 
groups separately. 𝑘 in the row titles stands for the magnitude in the column title. 
For instance, the first cell in the first row is the difference between the choices made 
in the seven decisions with the magnitude of €40 predicted by the model with 
parameter values (𝛽1, 𝛿2, 𝛼1)  and those predicted by the model with parameter 
values (𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼1). In other words, it is the marginal effect of allowing 𝛿 to vary 
with the magnitude from €20 to €40. The unit is 1 percent of the total budget.  
2.4.2 Individual-Level Estimation 
The aggregate-level estimation provides evidence of positive magnitude 
effects on the discount factor and on intertemporal substitutability. One may 
wonder whether these results also hold at the individual level. Indeed, we find a 
huge individual heterogeneity in choices. One concern is that, when testing the 
magnitude effect on the aggregate preferences, there might be a bias resulting 
from forcing all subjects to have the same preferences and the same distribution 
of noise. To deal with this concern, we also perform individual-level estimation 
and tests.  
2.4.2.1 Estimation and testing procedure 
We keep all the assumptions that underlie equation (2.1) except for 𝛽 since it 
is not identified in individual-level estimations. We estimate the discount factor 
(𝛿) and the intertemporal substitutability (𝛼) for each combination of subject and 
stake, and then test if the two parameters are increasing in the magnitude within-
subject.  





𝛽1, 𝛿𝑘 , 𝛼1 (Delayed):  21.3 34.7 36.6 48.6 
𝛽1, 𝛿𝑘 , 𝛼1 (Present): 21.8 36.5 38.1 50.7 
𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼𝑘 (Delayed): 24.8 33.9 44.4 65.5 
𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼𝑘 (Present): 27.7 38.0 49.2 72.8 
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One important difference from the aggregate-level estimation is that there 
might be an under-identification problem when a subject made no or only one 
interior choice under a stake. Actually, there are 627 out of 1015 (62%) 
combinations of subjects and stakes suffering from such a problem. We thereby 
adopt a conservative way to test the magnitude effect. First, we yield point 
estimates of 𝛿 and 𝛼 if possible. Whenever there is an under-identification 
problem, we remove the error term from (2.1) and then infer the intervals of 𝛿 
and 𝛼 that can generate the observations.  Second, we perform a one-tailed 
sign test on the two parameters, respectively, with the null hypotheses that they 
do not change with the magnitude. The sign test only requires that the distribution 
of a parameter does not differ between magnitudes, while it allows the 
distribution to be different across subjects. For a comparison between a point 
estimate and an interval estimate, we recognize a difference only if the point is 
not in the interior of the interval. For a comparison between two interval estimates, 
we recognize a difference if the two intervals do not overlap.  
2.4.2.2 Results 
Table 2.8 shows the results of the tests at the individual level. We reject the 
null hypotheses of no magnitude effect on the two parameters, in favor of positive 
magnitude effects. This shows that the two channels of the magnitude effect on 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results above imply that when an average subject faces a larger budget in 
an intertemporal allocation task, she behaves more patiently, but also she regards 
rewards to be more substitutable between dates.  
2.5.1 Relation with the Magnitude Effect on Risk Aversion 
According to the Discounted Expected Utility (DEU) theory, the risk attitude 
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are represented by the same 
parameter, since risk aversion and imperfect fungibility both originate from 
diminishing marginal utility. Therefore, one may wonder whether the magnitude 
effect on intertemporal substitutability is the same as the magnitude effect on risk 
attitudes.  
We find evidence against this equivalence. Holt and Laury (2002) investigated 
the magnitude effect on risk attitudes with Multiple Price List (MPL) questions. 
They found a significant, positive magnitude effect: when faced with a larger 
magnitude, people appear to be more risk averse in terms of the relative risk 
aversion. This is in the opposite direction as the effect we find. Their finding 
suggests an increase in the concavity as the magnitude increases while ours shows 
a movement towards linearity. This contradiction suggests that the magnitude 
effect on relative risk aversion is not driving the magnitude effect on 
intertemporal substitutability.  
Some other studies also suggest that risk aversion and intertemporal 
substitutability should be separated. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) found no 
significant correlation at the individual level between the curvature estimated by 
the CTB method and the risk attitude elicited by the MPL method. Abdellaoui et 
al. (2013), Miao and Zhong (2015) and Cheung (2015) also found that the utility 
curvature elicited from intertemporal tasks is different from that elicited from 




previous studies showed that the degrees of concavity are different for the two 
kinds of utility functions, we show that the degrees of concavity change in 
opposite directions when the stake is varied.  
This finding has implications for both theories and experimental methods. First, 
it lends support to the theories which separate intertemporal substitutability from 
risk aversion, such as Epstein and Zin (1989). Second, it casts doubt on the use 
of a risk-elicitation task to correct for the curvature when eliciting time 
preferences.  
2.5.2 Relation with Borrowing Constraints 
In theory, a binding borrowing constraint can lead to a magnitude effect on the 
monetary discount rate in a single-reward task if the background consumption is 
expected to grow over time, as shown by Epper (2015). However, Meier and 
Sprenger (2010) found that experimentally elicited long-run discount rates are 
uncorrelated with credit constraints, suggesting that on average, whether the 
borrowing constraint is binding does not affect intertemporal choices in 
experiments.  
Moreover, given the fact that subjects may have savings which provide limited 
liquidity, the fraction of subjects whose borrowing constraints are binding is 
increasing in the stake. For this reason, if the borrowing constraint is a main issue, 
we should observe that the intertemporal substitutability is decreasing in the stake, 
which is inconsistent with our results. Therefore, we believe that a binding 
borrowing constraint is not the main driver of our results.  
2.5.3 Relation with Existing Theories 
We discuss the implications of our empirical findings for some theories that 
may explain the magnitude effect on intertemporal choices.  
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One model that can account for the magnitude effect on the discount factor was 
proposed by Benhabib et al. (2010). They developed a model with a fixed cost of 
delaying rewards. The idea is that whenever a delayed reward is chosen, a fixed 
cost is incurred, so that as the stake increases, the cost becomes relatively less 
important and hence the subject appears more patient.  
Noor (2011) proposed a model of magnitude-dependent discounting, which 
leads to similar predictions. In his model, the discount function is increasing in 
the utility at the later period. As the stake gets larger, the discount function 
converges to 1. 16 
One theory that can explain the magnitude effect on intertemporal 
substitutability is an extended version of the dual-self bank-nightclub model of 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006). In the original model, the agent chooses the 
amount of pocket cash when no temptation is present, and then she chooses the 
amount of consumption when a windfall is available and temptation plays a role. 
The strategy for utility maximization is to spend all of the windfall when it is 
small but try to save some money out of the windfall when it is large. A small 
windfall is not integrated with the lifelong wealth, because the agent does not 
bother to perform self-control, but it is worth controlling oneself when the 
windfall is large. As a result, the utility function for windfalls is much more 
concave when the size of the windfall is below a certain threshold than when it is 
above the threshold.  
The model can explain a magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability if 
we impose the assumption that an agent who anticipates a reward in the future 
does not immediately adjust her cash allocation plan. Instead, she keeps the 
anticipated reward in the mental account of windfalls until it is received and part 
                                                        
16 Both models can explain the magnitude effect on the monetary discount rate in single-reward tasks. 
When they are applied to the intertemporal allocation tasks, both of them predict a jump from the sooner 
corner to an interior point or to the later corner in every wealth expansion path. Unfortunately, we are not 
able to confirm nor reject the existence of such jumps; since we have only five points on each wealth 




of it is consumed. Only after the remainder is moved into the mental account of 
savings does she reschedule her future consumption.  
When this assumption is used, the model predicts that a subject will tend to 
make interior choices when the budget is small, i.e., below the threshold induced 
by the self-control costs. Since the utility function for windfalls is very concave 
the subject balances extra consumption on the sooner date and on the later date. 
As the budget increases above the threshold, the subject will want to save part of 
it for consumption smoothing. Since the utility function for savings is much less 
concave (close to linear) these savings will be allocated fully to either the sooner 
date (when the interest rate is small) or the later date (when the interest rate is 
large). Hence, as the budget increases the intertemporal substitutability increases 
and it will appear as if the utility function has become less concave (see Appendix 
2.D for a simulation).  
Another model that can explain the magnitude effect on intertemporal 
substitutability is the mental zooming theory proposed by Holden (2014). The 
theory presumes that people integrate more background consumption with the 
experimental reward as the size of the reward increases. If the budget increases, 
individuals 'zoom out' as it were, and take a broader perspective in the decision 
problem. One reason may be that individuals are likely to divide and use up a 
bigger windfall over a longer time period. Based on the data collected from his 
field experiment with Malawian peasants, Holden showed that the magnitude 
effect on time preferences in single-reward tasks would disappear if the 
unobserved background consumption is assumed to be an increasing function of 
the stake.  
In intertemporal allocation tasks, the increasing background consumption can 
generate a magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability. To see why , 
denote the observed elasticity of intertemporal substitution in experimental 
rewards by 𝑒𝑧. The relationship between 𝑒𝑧 and preference parameters is 
















Since 𝑒𝑧 is increasing in both 𝛼 and 𝜔, an increase in 𝛼 and an increase in 
𝜔  are competing explanations for the magnitude effect on intertemporal 
substitutability. If subjects take into account more background consumption as 
the total budget increases, we would observe a greater sensitivity to the interest 
rate, i.e. a greater 𝑒𝑧 . When we assume a fixed background consumption, 
however, the pattern will be attributed to a magnitude effect on 𝛼.  
Both the mental-accounting Fudenberg-Levine model and the mental zooming 
theory point to partial integration with lifelong wealth, which seems to be an 
important mechanism of the magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability 
between rewards. Andersen et al. (2012) showed empirically that subjects only 
partially integrate experimental rewards with wealth in risk preference tasks. 
While they provide evidence of partial asset integration by exploiting variation 
in personal wealth, our results suggest that the degree of asset integration is 
increasing in the stake by providing within-subject evidence.  
None of the current models can explain both a magnitude effect on the discount 
factor and a magnitude effect on the intertemporal substitutability. Of course, the 
two channels can be explained by a mode-switching model in which individuals 
are assumed to have different preferences for different stakes. However, a truly 
unified explanation is still lacking.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Our study investigates the magnitude effect on intertemporal choices in a 
recently-introduced task, the intertemporal allocation task. After adapting the 
concept for the new task, we verify the existence of a magnitude effect. The 




implying that the factor which drives the present bias cannot fully account for the 
magnitude effect. 
We then look deeper into the effect, by exploring the channels. The results 
underscore the importance of a dimension which is often overlooked, namely, the 
intertemporal substitutability. We find evidence that both the discount factor and 
the intertemporal substitutability change with the magnitude of rewards.  
Some existing theories may provide explanations for one of the two channels. 
A cost-of-delay model (Benhabib et al., 2010) or a magnitude-dependent 
discounting model (Noor, 2011) can account for a magnitude effect on the 
discount factor.17 Models which allow the degree of asset integration (mental 
accounting) to vary with the size of the budget can explain a magnitude effect on 
intertemporal substitutability. However, a new theory would be needed to account 
for both channels simultaneously and in a unified way.  
For the magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability, existing theories 
tend to attribute it to the varying degree of asset integration, however, sharper 
tests are needed to check the conjecture and to explore specific factors. One 
possible way would be to restrict the dates on which rewards can be consumed 
and then to check if the restriction has an effect on intertemporal choices. 
 
                                                        




APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
2.A Rationality of Subjects in the Convex Time Budget 
Method 
The CTB method allows subjects to make interior choices, and hence makes it 
possible to measure discount rates and utility curvature simultaneously. However, 
Chakraborty et al. (2017) found that a proportion of subjects, especially those 
who make interior choices, violate wealth monotonicity in CTB tasks and that the 
magnitude of wealth monotonicity violations conditional on violating at least 
once are as large as that generated by uniform random choice, and hence 
questioned the rationality of subjects in making CTB decisions.  
In this appendix, we follow Chakraborty et al. (2017) to examine price 
monotonicity and wealth monotonicity of our dataset. In specific, we look at 
fractions of monotonicity violations among all subjects and among subjects who 
make at least one interior choice, respectively. We also measure the average 
magnitude of wealth monotonicity violations for those who violate wealth 
monotonicity at least once, and we compare it with the distribution of the 
magnitude generated by uniform random choice.  
Table A2.1 shows the rationality indices of the full sample and the subsamples 
as well as those generated by uniform random choice. The fractions of price 
monotonicity violations (2-3%) are less than the fractions of wealth monotonicity 
violations (10-20%). A possible reason is that prices are varied within decision 
forms but total budgets are varied across decision forms, and hence it is easier to 
make comparison across prices than across total budgets. Nevertheless, those 
fractions and the magnitudes of violations are much lower than those generated 
by uniform random choice, suggesting that our dataset and the subsample of 
subjects who make interior choices are highly informative.  
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Table A2.1: Rationality of Subjects Compared to Uniform Random Choice 
Notes: The first three rows present fractions of price monotonicity violations and 
wealth monotonicity violations as well as average magnitudes of violations in terms 
of euros in the full sample, the subsample of subjects who make at least one interior 
choice, and the subsample of subjects who violate wealth monotonicity at least once. 
The last row presents the means and the standard deviations of the same four indices 
generated by uniform random choice. The means and standard errors are calculated 
by simulating 10,000 times.  
2.B Parametric Analysis with Different Assumptions on 
Background Consumption 
We check the sensitivity of the parameter estimates (Table A2.2) and the 
magnitude effects (Table A2.3) to alternative assumptions on the background 
consumption. The results show that the magnitude effects on the discount factor 
and on intertemporal substitutability are robust, except when 𝜔 is assumed to be 




















Full sample 0.022 0.13 0.101 0.82 
Subjects who 
make at least 
one interior 
choice 




at least once  
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very small. However, with a small background consumption, one should rarely 
make corner choices due to the motivation of consumption smoothing. But we do 
observe many corner choices in our sample. Hence, the case with a small 𝜔 is 
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2.C Parametric Analysis with Estimation of 
Background Consumption 
The CRRA specification with exogenously set background consumption (𝜔) is 
simple and easy to estimate, however, one may suspect that the average self-
reported background consumption does not match the true background 
consumption integrated with the experimental rewards in decision making, or the 
utility function is misspecified. In particular, if the utility function is Hyperbolic 
Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA), 𝜔 in (2.1) does not represent the background 
consumption but is a mixture of the background consumption and the HARA 
intercept parameter.  
In order to meet the challenges above, we estimate 𝜔 instead of setting it 
exogenously. By doing this, we “let the data tell” what values are suitable for 𝜔, 
and we can also identify the magnitude effects on 𝜔.  
2.C.1 Model 
We assume a normally distributed error term at the choice level. The error term 
can be arisen either because of idiosyncratic shocks in preference or because of 
imprecision in placing the scrollbar.18 In specific, a latent choice is 
                                                        
18 In the model with a normally distributed error term additive to the log allocation ratio, the estimator 
of 𝜔 is nonlinear in the error term. Simulation shows that the estimator of 𝜔 is severely biased given 
our sample size, though it is asymptotically consistent. The model we assume here is the same as the one 
implicitly assumed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) when they perform the nonlinear least square (NLS) 
estimation. The difference is that we employ the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation, by which we take 
into account censoring.  




















































This is a two-limit nonlinear censored model, which can be estimated by the 
quasi-maximum likelihood method.  
2.C.2 Results 
Table A2.4 reports the estimates of the parameters from the specifications with 
magnitude-invariant parameters and with magnitude-specific parameters, 
respectively.  
Table A2.5 presents the estimates of the parameter differences between 
magnitudes. We find a significant magnitude effect on the discount rate. The 
magnitude effect on the exponent parameter, 𝛼, is only significant between the 
magnitudes of €20 and €40. This is reasonable since we find a strong magnitude 
effect on the background consumption and the HARA intercept parameter (i.e. 
𝜔 ), which have explained most of the magnitude effects on intertemporal 
substitutability.  
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Table A2.4. Discounting and Curvature Parameter Estimates in the Aggregate-Level 
Estimation with the HARA Specification 
Notes: Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimators. Column 1: assuming that parameters 
are the same across magnitudes. Column 2-6: assuming that parameters vary with 
magnitudes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors calculated via 





Magnitude: All €20 €40 €60 €80 €160 
Present bias: ?̂? 1.000 0.994 1.002 1.000 1.000 0.997 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Discount factor 
over four weeks: 
𝛿?̂? 
0.953 0.952 0.960 0.962 0.965 0.967 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Curvature 
parameter: ?̂? 
0.997 0.964 0.984 0.982 0.984 0.986 





9.556 10.713 15.790 22.551 30.834 67.814 
(2.046) (2.209) (3.364) (4.461) (5.896) (12.598) 
S.d. of the error 
term: ?̂? 
63.948 78.491 68.110 62.147 62.426 65.890 




Observations 7,105 7,105 
Uncensored 1,969 1,969 
Clusters 203 203 
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Table A2.5: Estimates of Parameter Differences between Magnitudes in the HARA Specification 
Notes: Estimates of parameter differences are inferred from the quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimates by the delta method. Parameters are separately set for each 
magnitude among €20, €40, €60, €80 and €160. There are 1,421 observations (203 
clusters) for each magnitude. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard 
errors calculated via the delta method. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 
percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
As we do for the CRRA specification, we use the estimates to predict choices 
in the 35 questions for both the Present Group and the Delayed Group. Table A2.6 
presents the marginal effects of allowing parameters to vary with the magnitude: 
in Row 1-2, we allow 𝛿 to vary with the magnitude of the decisions (as indicated 
by the column title), but control other two parameters to be the value estimated 
from the magnitude of €20; in Row 3-4, we allow 𝛼 and 𝜔 to vary with the 
magnitude. The results show that the marginal effect of allowing 𝛼 and 𝜔 to 
vary with the magnitude is comparable with the marginal effect of allowing 𝛿 to 
vary. It is consistent with our finding in the Tobit estimation, which implies that 
the magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability is at least equally important 
as the magnitude effect on the discount rate. 
Magnitude: €40 - €20 €60 - €40 €80 - €60 €160 - €80 €60 - €20 €80 - €40 €160 - €60 
Present bias: 
?̂? 
0.00807 -0.00180 0.00038 -0.00303 0.00572 -0.00197 -0.00265 





0.00734 0.00252* 0.00258 0.00267* 0.00986* 0.00510*** 0.00526** 
(0.00570) (0.00138) (0.00169) (0.00141) (0.00574) (0.00176) (0.00215) 
Curvature 
parameter: ?̂? 
0.02007*** 0.00097 0.00192 -0.00219 0.01827** 0.00012 0.00411 





5.077*** 6.761*** 8.283*** 36.981*** 11.838*** 15.044*** 45.263*** 
(1.959) (1.992) (2.471) (7.505) (2.932) (3.551) (8.805) 
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Table A2.6: Marginal Effects of Allowing a Parameter to Vary with Magnitudes in the 
HARA Specification 
Notes: The changes in choices predicted by the HARA nonlinear censored model 
using the parameter values indicated by the row title compared with (𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼1, 𝜔1), 
for the two groups separately. 𝑘 in the row titles stands for the magnitude in the 
column title. For instance, the first cell in the first row is the difference between the 
choices made in the seven decisions with the magnitude of €40 predicted by the model 
with parameter values (𝛽1, 𝛿𝑘, 𝛼1, 𝜔1)  and those predicted by the model with 
parameter values (𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼1, 𝜔1). In other words, it is the marginal effect of allowing 
𝛿 to vary with the magnitude from €20 to €40.  
2.D A Simulation of the Mental-Accounting 
Fudenberg-Levine Model 
We perform a simulation according to the mental-accounting Fudenberg-
Levine model described in Section 2.5.3. Figure A2.1 shows how the dependent 
variable in our Tobit estimation, ln (
𝑧𝑡+𝜔
𝑧𝑡+𝜏+𝜔
) , changes with the independent 
variable, ln 𝑅.  
Figure A2.1(a) displays the curves in case the true model is specified by 




Thus, a greater slope stands for a larger intertemporal substitutability. The 
horizontal-axis intercept is − ln𝛿. Thus a greater horizontal-axis intercept stands 
for a smaller discount factor.  
Figure A2.1(b) displays the curves in case the true model is the mental-
accounting Fudenberg-Levine model. When the budget is €20, both rewards are 
taken as pocket cash, so the curve is a straight line, as same as predicted by (2.1). 
Magnitude: €40 €60 €80 €160 
Parameter values used 
in prediction: 
𝛽1, 𝛿𝑘, 𝛼1, 𝜔1 (Delayed):  13.9 22.0 25.9 28.0 
𝛽1, 𝛿𝑘, 𝛼1, 𝜔1 (Present): 17.3 22.1 26.0 28.1 
𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼𝑘, 𝜔𝑘  (Delayed): 8.5 19.4 26.1 36.5 
𝛽1, 𝛿1, 𝛼𝑘, 𝜔𝑘  (Present): 10.9 21.7 29.0 40.2 
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However, when the budget gets larger, the curve is with a greater slope. Therefore, 
we observe a positive relation between intertemporal substitutability and the size 
of budget. On the other hand, the horizontal-axis intercept does not change with 




(a)  Prediction of the model specified by equation (2.1) 




(b) Prediction of the extended Fudenberg-Levine model 
Figure A2.1: Simulated Relationships between the Dependent Variable and the 



























































































3 MEASURING PREFERENCES OVER 
INTERTEMPORAL PROFILES: MAGNITUDE EFFECT 
AND ALL-SOONER EFFECT 
Many economic decisions require people to choose between intertemporal 
profiles. An intertemporal profile is a combination of outcomes that occur at 
different points in time (e.g. 20 euros today and 20 euros in a month is a two-
outcome profile). Individuals who select pension plans are choosing among 
profiles of income over their lifetime. College graduates who decide whether to 
look for a job or to continue their education are choosing among profiles of 
income and effort.  
Despite the importance of understanding choices between intertemporal 
profiles, existing experimental measurements of such choices are mostly 
confined to a special case: choices between single dated rewards (i.e. profiles 
with only one non-zero outcome, such as 20 euros in a month, as opposed to 
mixed profiles, which have more than one non-zero outcome). A limitation of 
measurement methods using single dated rewards only is that, even if a simple 
discounting model with only two parameters, a discount rate and a utility 
curvature, is assumed, those parameters cannot be identified simultaneously. One 
needs to identify the utility curvature by measuring risk preferences. This joint 
elicitation method has been questioned since recent evidence showed that utility 
over time is different from utility under risk: the utility curvatures over time and 
under risk are uncorrelated at the individual level (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a), 
quantitatively different (Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Miao and Zhong, 2015), and 
change with stake in opposite directions (Sun and Potters, 2016).  
In this paper, we introduce a new method for measuring intertemporal 
preferences. The idea is simple: one just directly measures preferences over 
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intertemporal profiles. When a classic discounting model is assumed (i.e. the 
intertemporal utility function is composed of a stationary period utility function 
and a magnitude-independent discount function), the method measures the 
discount rate and the utility curvature simultaneously. Compared to previous 
methods (Abdellaoui et al. 2010, Andreoni and Sprenger 2012a, and Cheung 
2015a), our method has the advantage of being parameter-free, incentive 
compatible and independent of time horizon effects at the same time. Most 
importantly, the method requires weak assumptions on preferences to be 
measured. Hence, it allows studies of a wider range of models, including those 
having non-stationary period utility functions (Benhabib et al., 2010), those 
having a magnitude-dependent discount function (Noor, 2011), and those having 
an additively non-separable utility function (Holden and Quiggin, 2017).  
We then apply the method to investigate how people make choices between 
two-outcome intertemporal profiles of monetary income. A two-outcome 
intertemporal profile of monetary income consists of a reward on a sooner date 
(sooner reward) and a reward on a later date (later reward). Existing models that 
provide similar predictions on choices between single dated rewards have 
different predictions on choices between two-outcome profiles. We focus on two 
attributes of preferences which distinguish models from each other: how choices 
between two-outcome profiles change with the scale of outcomes (the magnitude 
effect), and whether people are overly impatient in case it is possible to have all 
rewards on a sooner date (the all-sooner effect).  
The study on how choices between intertemporal profiles change as all 
outcomes are scaled up, is an extension of the well-known magnitude effect over 
single dated rewards. Studies using single dated rewards found that a pure later 
reward (i.e. a two-outcome profile with zero outcome on the sooner date and 
positive outcome on the later date) that is equally good as a pure sooner reward 
(i.e. a two-outcome profile with positive outcome on the sooner date and zero 




by the same ratio (e.g. Thaler, 1981; see Andersen et al., 2013 for a review).19 
But little is known about how choices between general profiles change. Models 
aimed at explaining the magnitude effect over single dated rewards provide 
qualitatively different predictions on choices between intertemporal profiles 
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Noor, 2011; Baucells and Heukamp, 2012; 
Benhabib et al. 2010), and hence it is interesting to know which model is more 
consistent with observation. In specific, those models differ in predictions on two 
channels of the magnitude effect: the discount rate and the utility curvature. The 
two channels represent patience and perceived fungibility, respectively, and can 
predict opposite directions of change as outcomes are scaled up.  
The second question, whether people are overly impatient when a pure sooner 
reward is available, concerns a channel of impatience other than discounting. Let 
(𝑥, 𝑦) stands for the profile of receiving €𝑥 on a sooner date (e.g. tomorrow) 
and €𝑦 on a later date (e.g. in five months). A decision-maker who is indifferent 
between (28,10) and (20,20) reveals that she is impatient; she is willing to 
exchange €10 on the later date for €8 on the sooner date. The question here is 
whether she prefers (36,0) to (20,20). If so, she is willing to exchange later 
rewards for sooner rewards at a higher price, suggesting that she is more impatient 
when one of the options is a pure sooner reward. This phenomenon is predicted 
by a model with a fixed cost of waiting (introduced by Benhabib et al. 2010 and 
extended to two-outcome profiles), because a fixed cost incurred whenever one 
needs to wait implies a preference for pure sooner rewards over mixed profiles. 
The phenomenon in question is analogous to the certainty effect (Allais, 1953; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), which is about a preference for certain outcomes 
over risky prospects. It has implications for estimating preferences in scientific 
studies and prescriptive consultation: omitting the all-sooner effect leads to an 
overestimation of the discount rate and an underestimation of the utility curvature.  
                                                        
19 For instance, in Halevy (2015), a median subject is indifferent between $10 today and $10.59 in a 
week, implying a weekly discount rate of 5.9%, but she is indifferent between $100 today and $103.68 in 
a week, implying a weekly discount rate of 3.7%. 
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Several experiments also involved choices between intertemporal profiles but 
addressed different questions than the current paper. Andreoni and Sprenger 
(2012a) and Cheung (2015a) found evidence on convexity of preferences. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2010) examined the gain-loss asymmetry. Attema et al. (2016) 
introduced a measurement method of the discount function without measuring 
the period utility function. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b), Miao and Zhong 
(2015), and Cheung (2015b) investigated the interaction of time and risk.20  
This paper makes four contributions to the literature on intertemporal choices. 
First, the paper introduces a new method for measuring preferences over 
intertemporal profiles. The method does not require parametric assumptions of 
utility functions or discount functions, nor does it require the assumption of a 
stationary period utility function and a magnitude-independent discount function. 
It even allows additive non-separability. Therefore, the method provides an 
option to measure preferences under minimum assumptions. This implies that a 
wider range of models can be studied, and that misspecifications are less likely 
to occur.  
Second, the paper is the first to investigate whether people have a preference 
for pure sooner rewards over mixed profiles, i.e. whether the all-sooner effect 
exists. The all-sooner effect suggests a different channel of impatience than 
discounting. It also has implications for the measurement of preferences: if one 
measures preferences with single dated rewards, the existence of the all-sooner 
effect and the ignorance of it imply an overestimation of the discount rate and an 
underestimation of the utility curvature.  
Third, the paper examines the channels of the magnitude effect non-
parametrically. The different channels of the magnitude effect determine in what 
directions choices change with the stake. Sun and Potters (2016) performed the 
first investigation into the magnitude effect on choices between intertemporal 
                                                        
20 There are also studies using field data to investigate properties of preferences over intertemporal 




profiles, and disentangled channels by assuming a parametric model. In contrast, 
the current paper explores the channels of the magnitude effect without assuming 
any specific functional form. 
Lastly, the paper provides a simple model that captures all characteristics found 
in our experiment, and it is flexible enough to represent different types of subjects. 
The model facilitates parametric estimation of preferences in future applications.  
We find evidence that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is larger for 
higher stakes, but no evidence shows that the generalized discount factor is also 
larger for higher stakes. This suggests that scales of outcomes affect choices 
mainly through the perceived fungibility of rewards across time, rather than the 
patience in general. We find evidence of the all-sooner effect, suggesting that 
people have a preference for pure sooner rewards over mixed profiles.  
Our results provide implications for preference estimation with single dated 
rewards or small incentives. If the all-sooner effect is omitted, estimating 
preferences with single dated rewards will lead to an overestimation of the 
discount rate and an underestimation of the utility curvature. If the magnitude 
effect is omitted, estimating preferences with small stakes will lead to an 
overestimation of the utility curvature.  
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.1 introduces 
some concepts and notations. Section 3.2 presents the measurement method. 
Section 3.3 describes the theoretical framework of our application. In particular, 
the predictions of existing models regarding the magnitude effect and the all-
sooner effect are provided. The experimental design is presented in Section 3.4. 
Section 3.5 shows the results. A tractable and flexible model which 
accommodates all characteristics found in our results is also provided. A 
discussion follows in Section 3.6.  
 




We consider two-outcome intertemporal profiles, each of which is represented 
by (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ2
+ ≡ [0,+∞)2, where 𝑥 denotes the outcome at time point 𝑡1 (i.e. 
the sooner reward), 𝑦 denotes the outcome at time point 𝑡2 = 𝑡1 + 𝜏 (i.e. the 
later reward), and 𝜏 is the delay. We fix 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 to control the time horizon 
effects in this study, though our measurement method can be used in situations 
with different front-end delays and delays. 21  
We examine preferences ≽ over intertemporal profiles in ℝ2
+ . ~ denotes 
indifference as usual. We restrict our attention to preferences that are represented 
by a utility function, 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) , which is continuous, strictly increasing and 
differentiable on the sooner boundary [0,+∞) × {0} and in the remaining part 
of the space [0,+∞) × (0,+∞), respectively. By allowing the preference to be 
discontinuous or non-monotonic between the sooner boundary and the interior, 
we accommodate the fixed-cost-of-waiting model by Benhabib et al. (2010).22  
Following the convention, the marginal rate of substitution of the sooner 
reward for the later reward (henceforth MRS) at profile (𝑥, 𝑦) is  






The MRS at profile (𝑥, 𝑦) measures how much sooner reward a decision-maker 
is willing to exchange for one unit of later reward, which reflects the decision-
maker’s patience locally at the profile. She is more patient locally if she has a 
larger MRS.  
Suppose (𝑥0, 𝑦0) is a profile in ℝ2
+, and 𝐿 is a ray in ℝ2
+ from the origin 
with the income ratio 
𝑥
𝑦
= 𝜆 ∈ [0,+∞]. By continuity and strict monotonicity, 
                                                        
21 There are numerous studies on time horizon effects, including the discussions on the present bias, 
time inconsistency and sub-additivity in discounting. See, for instance, a recent synthesis by Dohmen et 
al. (2017). In Section 3.6, we discuss how time horizon effects can be combined with our findings.  
22 In Section 3.6, we discuss another set of assumptions where monotonicity holds for the entire space 
but transitivity can be violated. In that case, there are also models consistent with our empirical results.  
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there must be a profile (𝑥1, 𝑦1) ∈ 𝐿 such that (𝑥0, 𝑦0)~(𝑥1, 𝑦1).  The average 
rate of substitution of the sooner reward for the later reward (henceforth ARS) 
between the profile (𝑥, 𝑦) and the ray 𝐿 is  




The ARS reflects the patience revealed from choices between (𝑥0, 𝑦0)  and 
profiles on 𝐿. The decision-maker is more patient if she has a larger ARS.  
3.2 Measurement Method 
We introduce a new method of measuring preferences over intertemporal 
profiles in a parameter-free way. The method does not require the assumption of 
a stationary utility function and a magnitude-independent discount function. It 
even allows the preference to be additively non-separable.  
The main idea of the method is to measure indifference curves through a set of 
pre-determined profiles. For measuring each indifference curve, a few 
indifference relations are elicited between one pre-determined profile and profiles 
with a few pre-determined income ratios. Figure 3.1 illustrates how an 
indifference curve is measured. The indifference curve through the predetermined 
profile (𝑥0, 𝑦0)  is measured by eliciting the indifference relations between 




1,… , 𝐽 are pre-determined by the experimenter and satisfy 0 ≤ 𝜆1 < 𝜆2 < ⋯ <
𝜆𝐽 ≤ ∞. By connecting all those equally good profiles, an indifference curve is 
obtained.  




Figure 3.1: Parameter-Free Method to Measure Preferences over Intertemporal 
Profiles 
To elicit each of the indifference relation, a choice list is used. In one choice 
list, 𝑀 binary choice problems are presented. One of the options in all those 
problems is the balanced profile, (𝑥0, 𝑦0). The other option moves along the line 
towards the origin. For instance, in the choice list eliciting the indifference 
relation between (𝑥0, 𝑦0) and (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) , one of the options is always (𝑥0, 𝑦0) , 












𝑀 = 𝜆𝑗 and either 𝑥𝑗
1 > 𝑥𝑗
2 > ⋯ > 𝑥𝑗
𝑀 or 𝑦𝑗
1 > 𝑦𝑗
2 > ⋯ > 𝑦𝑗
𝑀 holds. Since 
the varying option is getting worse as a subject moves down the list, the 
indifference relation can be identified by looking at the switch point. Figure 3.2 
shows an example of a choice list. The RIGHT option is always (€20, €20), while 
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the LEFT option changes from (€0, €60) to (€0, €20), all of which have an income 
ratio of zero.  
The measurement method has some advantages compared to previous methods. 
Compared to the chained procedure used by Abdellaoui et al. (2010), our 
elicitation is incentive compatible, and does not rely on additive separability. 
Incentivization is useful especially for studies on the magnitude effect, because 
hypothetical studies reported a much larger size of magnitude effect than real 
stake ones. The flexibility of our method enables the study of a wider range of 
models, including those with non-stationary or additively non-separable utility 
functions. Compared to the Convex Time Budget method (Andreoni and 
Sprenger 2012a) which measures the choice correspondence, our method directly 
measures the preference relations between pairs of profiles, and hence does not 
rely on parametric assumptions of utility functions. Compared to the choice list 
used by Cheung (2015a) which varies the delay, our method fixes the front-end 
delay and the delay, so that the measurement is independent of time horizon 
effects. This implies researchers do not need to assume exponential discounting 
or any other discount function to obtain estimates of discount rates. Compared to 
Attema et al. (2016) which measures discount functions without measuring utility 
functions, our method estimates the discount function and the utility function 
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One disadvantage of our method is that it requires a large number of choices 
for identifying an indifference curve. This is caused by two reasons. First, for 
identifying each indifference relation, a choice list with tens of binary choice 
problems is needed. However, when ordered choice lists are used and 
computerized programs force subjects to switch at most once in each list, subjects 
only need to make one actual decision for each list (see Section 3.4.1). This could 
substantially reduce the workload of subjects. Second, measuring an indifference 
curve with (𝐽 + 1)  points requires 𝐽  choice lists. This is a price for non-
parametric measurement and can be reduced if some parametric assumptions are 
imposed.  
3.3 Measuring Preferences and Testing Models: Theory 
We apply our method to measure preferences over two-outcome intertemporal 
profiles. Since our method requires weak assumptions on the model to be 
measured, the measurement is especially suitable for testing models of 
intertemporal choices, including those beyond a classic discounting model.  
We are interested in testing models of intertemporal choices because most 
existing models provide similar predictions to choices between single dated 
rewards but qualitatively different predictions to choices between intertemporal 
profiles.  
We focus on two attributes of preferences: how choices change as outcomes 
are scaled up (magnitude effect) and whether people are overly impatient when a 
pure sooner reward is available (all-sooner effect). Those two attributes are key 
to predicting choices, have clear economic meanings and apply to all models 
satisfying weak assumptions. Importantly, existing models have different 
predictions on the two attributes, so they can be used to distinguish models.  
In the following subsections, we define and interpret the magnitude effect and 
the all-sooner effect, and then provide predictions of existing models on the two 
attributes.  
3.3. Measuring Preferences and Testing Models: Theory 
69 
 
3.3.1 Channels of the Magnitude Effect 
In order to study how choices over intertemporal profiles change with the stake, 
we look at two properties of intertemporal preferences.  
First, the generalized discount factor (henceforth GDF) at the magnitude of 𝑥 
is the MRS at the balanced profile (𝑥, 𝑥). Formally,  






If the preference can be represented by a classic discounting model, i.e. it is 
representable by an additively separable utility function with a stationary utility 
function and a magnitude-independent discount function, as  
(3.4) 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑢(𝑥) + 𝐷(𝜏) ∙ 𝑢(𝑦),  






= 𝐷(𝜏).  
Thus, the GDF reduces to the regular discount factor of a delay 𝜏 in a classic 
discounting model.  
Second, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (henceforth EIS) at a profile 
(𝑥, 𝑦) is the relative change in income ratio as a response to a relative change in 








′(𝑥(𝑄, 𝑢), 𝑦(𝑄, 𝑢))
𝑈1
′(𝑥(𝑄, 𝑢), 𝑦(𝑄, 𝑢))
, 
 
where 𝑄 ≡ ln (
𝑥
𝑦
) and 𝑢 = 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦).  




′ is the MRS, which is equal to the 
interest rate when utility is optimized. As usual, the elasticity measures the 
sensitivity of quantity ratios to relative price. The larger the EIS, the more 
sensitive choices are to changes in interest rate.  
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Graphically, the EIS is a measure of the local curvature of the indifference 
curve: the larger the elasticity, the less convex the indifference curve is around 
(𝑥, 𝑦). In other words, it measures the rate of change in the MRS as the profile 
moves along the indifference curve.  
If the preference is represented by a classical discounting model with a power 
utility function, i.e.  







then it holds  




Hence, the EIS reduces to a positive transformation of the curvature parameter 
𝛼. The linear utility model corresponds to 𝛼 = 1, or = ∞, and the Leontief 
utility model corresponds to 𝛼 = ∞, or = 0.  
We focus on the two properties of preferences for four reasons. First of all, 
those properties have important economic meanings. As long as the preference is 
convex, the GDF corresponds to the interest rate at which the decision maker is 
willing to hold a balanced profile. In this sense, it reflects the decision maker’s 
average patience at the corresponding magnitude. It also predicts how people 
make choices between close-to-balanced profiles. On the other hand, the EIS 
measures the perceived fungibility between the sooner reward and the later 
reward. It also predicts how choices between unbalanced profiles differ from 
those between close-to-balanced profiles.  
Besides their economic relevance, the two properties also have the advantage 
of generality. They can be obtained for any preference under our weak 
assumptions. They do not rely on the assumption of a specific functional form, 
nor on the existence of a stationary period utility function or a magnitude-
independent discount function. They do not even require additive separability. 
Hence, empirical results based on the two properties are robust, and tests based 
on them can be applied to a wide range of models.  
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Though the definitions of the GDF and the EIS are independent of model 
assumptions, they reduce to familiar parameters when some popular assumptions 
are imposed. Thereby, with those assumptions, findings about the two properties 
are comparable to those in previous studies.  
Most importantly, how the GDF and the EIS change with the scale of outcomes 
have different implications for how choices change with the scale. Figure 3.3 
shows how choices change as both profiles are scaled up, if the GDF or the EIS 
is larger for a higher stake, respectively. In the two panels, each line segment 
represents a binary choice problem, and the two endpoints of each line stand for 
the two options. If the GDF is larger for a higher stake, as shown in Figure 3.3(a), 
the decision-maker is indifferent between the two profiles indicated by the line 
segment when their stakes are low, but prefers the profile with a larger proportion 
of later reward when all outcomes are scaled up. This suggests that she appears 
to be more patient in choices between close-to-balanced profiles when stakes are 
higher. If the EIS is larger when the profile is scaled up, as shown in Figure 3.3(b), 
when outcomes are scaled up, the decision-maker care less about smoothing but 
more about the discounted sum of amounts, and hence the decision-maker 
appears to be more patient in choices between future-leaning profiles (i.e. two-
outcome profiles of which the later reward has a greater amount than the sooner 
reward) and less patient in choices between present-leaning profiles (i.e. two-
outcome profiles of which the sooner reward has a greater amount than the later 
reward). The two channels can work simultaneously, making the decision-maker 
more patient in choices between future-leaning profiles, but how choices between 
present-leaning profiles change depends on the net effect of the two channels.  
3.3.2 The All-Sooner Effect 
The all-sooner effect exists if there exist a mixed profile, (𝑥1, 𝑦1) , a pure 
sooner reward, (𝑥0, 0) , and a parameter 𝜆 ∈ (0,1) , such that (𝑥1, 𝑦1) ≽
(𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥0, 𝜆𝑦1) and (𝑥0, 0) ≻ (𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥0, 𝜆𝑦1).  
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The intuition of the all-sooner effect is that people have a preference for pure 
sooner rewards. A pure sooner reward brings a higher utility than mixed profiles 
close by. One consequence is that people appear to be less patient when one of 
the options is a pure sooner reward. Figure 3.4 shows an example: (𝑥1, 𝑦1) , 
(𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥0, 𝜆𝑦1)  and (𝑥0, 0)  are three profiles on a straight line, 
(𝑥1, 𝑦1) , (𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥0, 𝜆𝑦1) and (𝑥2, 0) are equally good, and 𝑥2 < 𝑥0 . 
By monotonicity, (𝑥0, 0) is more favored than the other three profiles, and hence 
the all-sooner effect exists. As a result, the indifference relation between (𝑥1, 𝑦1) 
and (𝑥2, 0) reveals an ARS of 
𝑥2−𝑥1
𝑦1
, which is less than the ARS revealed by the 




Hence, given the same rate of return, the decision-maker appears to be less patient 
in a choice problem where a pure sooner reward is available.  
The all-sooner effect is analogous to the certainty effect. The certainty effect is 
about the larger disutility caused by a reduction in probability from a certain 
prospect than by a reduction in probability from a risky prospect. In contrast, the 
all-sooner effect is about the larger disutility caused by the delay of some money 
from a pure sooner reward than by a delay of some money from a mixed profile.  




(a) When the GDF becomes larger, people appear to be more patient in choices  
between close-to-balanced profiles 
 
(b) When the EIS becomes larger, revealed patience changes in different directions  
for choices in different domains 
Figure 3.3: Implications of Different Channels of the Magnitude Effect 




Figure 3.4: The All-Sooner Effect Implies a Violation of Convexity 
The all-sooner effect is consistent with the fixed-cost-of-waiting model 
proposed by Benhabib et al. (2010). They argue that subjects behave as if they 
incur a fixed cost (of $4, as calibrated in their experiment) when a sooner reward 
is delayed entirely to the later date, regardless of the amount being delayed. They 
used the model to explain decreasing impatience and the magnitude effect over 
single dated rewards. It can also be used to account for the all-sooner effect if the 
model is extended to intertemporal profiles in the following way: a fixed cost is 
incurred unless one receives all the money on the earliest possible day. Figure 3.5 
shows how the fixed-cost-of-waiting model generates the all-sooner effect. The 
indifference curve is discontinuous at the sooner boundary; it jumps from (𝑥2
′ , 0) 
to (𝑥2, 0) , so that (𝑥1, 𝑦1) , (𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥0, 𝜆𝑦1) and (𝑥2, 0) are equally 
good, while (𝑥0, 0) is more favored. Thereby, the all-sooner effect exists.  




Figure 3.5: A Fixed Cost of Waiting Leads to the All-Sooner Effect 
The all-sooner effect has implications for both theory and empirical work. First, 
it suggests a channel of impatience other than discounting. Impatience between 
single dated rewards is usually modelled as discounting. While discounting 
represents a proportional cost of delaying rewards, the all-sooner effect stands for 
a disproportional cost, including the case of a fixed cost. It is interesting to know 
whether the impatience between single dated rewards is caused by discounting or 
the all-sooner effect or both, because the two channels have different implications 
for choices between intertemporal profiles.  
Second, the all-sooner effect implies a violation of convexity. Convexity is 
assumed by most models and applications on intertemporal choices. Intuitively, 
convexity says people have a preference for outcome smoothing, i.e. they prefer 
more balanced profiles. The all-sooner effect violates convexity, because the 
preference for pure sooner rewards outweighs the preference for smoothing when 
the difference in income ratio is small. Figure 3.4 shows how the all-sooner effect 
implies a violation of convexity. By definition, (𝑥1, 𝑦1) ≽ (𝜆𝑥1 + (1 −
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𝜆)𝑥0, 𝜆𝑦1)  and (𝑥0, 0) ≻ (𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥0, 𝜆𝑦1) . Therefore, the indifference 
curve cannot be convex between (𝑥1, 𝑦1) and (𝑥2, 0).
23  
The all-sooner effect is not ruled out by existing evidence of convexity. In 
previous studies, convexity was either tested with choices between mixed profiles 
(Cheung, 2015a) or tested parametrically with the assumption of a uniform 
curvature (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a). Hence, their results are not conflicting 
with non-convexity near the sooner boundary. Abdellaoui et al. (2010) also found 
evidence of convexity. We notice that in their results, the median subject is less 
patient between a pure sooner reward and a mixed profile than between two 
mixed profiles with the lowest amounts. This is actually in line with the all-sooner 
effect.24  
Third, the all-sooner effect also has implications for estimating preferences. 
Estimating preferences with single dated rewards leads to an overestimation of 
the discount rate if the all-sooner effect is omitted, because part of the 
“discounting” is actually due to the all-sooner effect. Estimating preferences with 
both single dated rewards and some mixed profile leads to an underestimation of 
the utility curvature if the all-sooner effect is omitted, because the all-sooner 
effect cancels out part of the convexity.  
3.3.3 Predictions of Various Models 
In order to investigate what kinds of models provide predictions more 
consistent with empirical patterns on the magnitude effect and the all-sooner 
effect, we list out the predictions of various models in terms of the magnitude 
effect on the GDF and the EIS and the all-sooner effect.  
                                                        
23 The all-sooner effect is related to outcomes, and not to timing. Thereby, it cannot be explained by 
any discount function.  
24 They did not perform a formal test on the non-convexity. Besides, their measurement relies on the 
assumption of additive separability, and entails risks in the sooner rewards. Therefore, their dataset is not 
ideal for performing a test on the all-sooner effect.  
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Table 3.1 summarizes the predictions of eight models on the two attributes of 
our interest. Proofs are provided in Appendix 3.A.  
The first three models in Table 3.1 are the most popular ones in the empirical 
literature. All of them are classic discounting models. The first model assumes a 
power utility function, the second a power utility function with a background 
consumption (also called Stone-Geary utility function), and the third an 
exponential utility function. Since they are all discounting models with a 
magnitude-independent discount function, they predict a constant GDF. The first 
model predicts a constant EIS, and the other two predict an EIS decreasing in the 
stake.  
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) assumed a sub-proportional utility function to 
account for the magnitude effect over single dated rewards. The model predicts a 
constant GDF, but the relation between the EIS and the stake is ambiguous. Two 
examples are given to show that the EIS can be either increasing or decreasing in 
the stake. If the period utility function is a power function with a positive 




the EIS is increasing in the stake.  
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) proposed a bank-nightclub model based on their 
costly self-control model. The main idea is that people who receive a windfall 
will balance the impulse of consuming and the long-run benefits of savings if the 
windfall is not too small, but will spend all the money if the windfall is small. If 
we take this model as an expression of how people treat windfalls, assume that 
people do not adjust their consumption plan until they receive the windfall, and 
omit the effect of the wealth accumulation in the first period on the background 
consumption in the second period, then we have a classic discounting model with 
the following period utility function:  







































where 𝛾 ≥ 0 is the coefficient of the self-control cost, 𝛿 < 1 is the discount 
factor, 𝛼 < 1  is the utility curvature and 𝜔 > 0  is the background 
consumption. When the outcome is small, the period utility function is exactly a 
power utility function with a small background consumption, 𝜔 . When the 
outcome is larger than a cutoff, the utility function gradually approximates a 
power utility function with a large background consumption, 
𝜔
1−𝛿
 , which is 
actually the life-long wealth. The model also predicts a constant GDF, but it 
predicts an upward jump in the EIS.  
Unlike the previous two models which assume that changes in stakes only 
affect the period utility function, Noor (2011) proposed a model with a 
magnitude-dependent discount function. The idea is that people are extremely 
impatient toward a very small outcome, but as the size of the outcome increases, 
they become more patient. The parametric model provided by the author predicts 
that the GDF increases from 0 to 1. Meanwhile the indifference curve changes 
from infinitely concave (i.e. only the sooner reward matters) to mildly convex 
(the same as the discounting model with a power utility function).25  
A third explanation to the magnitude effect is given by Benhabib et al. (2010) 
in their fixed-cost-of-waiting model. If a fixed cost is incurred whenever the 
decision-maker delays some money from the sooner date to the later date, we get 
a discounting model which is discontinuous on the sooner boundary. The model 
predicts a constant GDF and a constant EIS, as well as the all-sooner effect.  
Lastly, we consider Holden and Quiggin’s (2017) zooming model. In their 
original model, the background consumption is a function of the later reward in 
                                                        
25 The general form of the model has too few restrictions to provide a definitive prediction about the 
GDF and the EIS. Baucells and Heukamp’s (2012) Probability and Time Tradeoff model is of a similar 
case. We thereby only consider the parametric form provided by Noor (2011).  
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a binary choice problem. We adapt the model to choices over intertemporal 
profiles by modifying the background consumption into a function of the total 
amount of the rewards in a profile. The model is additively non-separable. Due 
to the generality of the GDF and the EIS, we are still able to examine the channels 
of the magnitude effect generated by this model. The model also predicts a 
decreasing EIS, and meanwhile it predicts a GDF decreasing in the stake.  
To sum up, the models we consider differ in their predictions about whether 
the GDF and the EIS are larger, the same or smaller for higher stakes, and whether 
the all-sooner effect exists. In order to tell what kinds of models are consistent 
with empirical patterns, we measure the preferences and focus on the following 
three empirical questions:  
Question 1: Is the EIS the same for different stakes? 
Question 2: Is the GDF the same for different stakes? 
Question 3: Is the all-sooner effect no-existent?  
We measure the ARSs between the balanced profile and one of the four rays 
from the origin (two interior rays and the two boundaries), both for a lower stake 
and for a higher stake. With the measures, we test if the GDF and the EIS are 
larger, the same or smaller for the higher stake than for the lower stake, and if the 
ARS is smaller near the sooner boundary. By checking those features, we 
examine what kinds of models better predict observed choices.  
Our test of models on intertemporal choices is similar in spirit with 
Kerschbamer’s (2015) test of models on distributional preferences, in the sense 
that we both test models according to core features of preferences rather than 
goodness of fit of specific models. The idea is to classify and test models in terms 
of the characteristics with important economic meanings and high predictive 
power, keeping the test unaffected by specific assumptions that are mainly for 
technical convenience.  
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Table 3.1: Predictions of Various Models in terms of the GDF, the EIS and the All-Sooner Effect 
Model EIS GDF 
All-sooner 
effect 
Power utility function + magnitude-independent 








where 𝛼 < 1 
Constant Constant No 
Power utility function + positive background 









where 𝛼 < 1 and 𝜔 > 0 
Decreasing in the 






Exponential utility function + magnitude-
independent discount factor:  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = 1 − exp(−𝑥) + 𝛿(1 − exp(−𝑦)) 
Decreasing in the 
stake, and converging 
to 0 
Constant No 
Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) sub-
proportional utility function:  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑢(𝑥) + 𝛿𝑢(𝑦) 
where  






Depending on 𝑢(∙). 
E.g. Decreasing in the 
stake if 𝑢(𝑥) =
(𝑥+𝜔)𝛼
𝛼
, but increasing 
in the stake if 





A mental accounting version of Fudenberg and 
Levine’s (2006) bank-nightclub model 
First decreasing, then 
jumping to a larger 
value, and decreasing 
again 
Constant No 
The parametric form of Noor’s (2011) 
magnitude-dependent discounting model:  











where 𝛽 < 𝛼 < 1 and 𝑑 < 1 
The indifference 
curve turns from 
infinitely concave to 
mildly convex (with 





from 0 to 1 
No 




3.4 Measuring Preferences and Testing Models: 
Experiment 
3.4.1 Design 
We implemented our measurement method in a real-stake experiment. 
Specifically, we measure subjects’ preferences over intertemporal profiles 
consisting of two monetary rewards, one received in 𝑡1 = 1 day, and the other 
received in 𝑡2 = 141 days. The two dates are both in the future, and thus the 
present bias is ruled out.  
For each subject, we elicit two indifference curves in the (𝑥, 𝑦) space, one 
through the profile (€20, €20), and the other through (€80, €80). For each 
indifference curve, we use choice lists to elicit the indifference relation between 
the balanced profile and unbalanced profiles whose income ratio is among the 
following four values: 0, 
1
2
 , 2 or ∞ . Hence, the following eight indifference 
relations are elicited from each subject:  
(0, 𝑦1,𝐿)~(20,20), (𝑥2,𝐿, 2𝑥2,𝐿)~(20,20), (2𝑦3,𝐿, 𝑦3,𝐿)~(20,20), (𝑥4,𝐿 , 0)~(20,20), 
Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter’s (2010) fixed-
cost-of-waiting model:  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = {
1
𝛼






𝑦𝛼 − 𝐶, if 𝑦 > 0
 
where 𝛼 < 1 and 𝐶 > 0 
Constant Constant if 
𝑦 > 0 
Yes, and is 
less 
pronounced 
at a higher 
stake 
A simple version of Holden and Quiggin’s 
(2017) zooming model:  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) =








where 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛼 < 1 and 𝑏 > 0 
Decreasing in the 






from 1 to 
𝛿 
No 
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(0, 𝑦1,𝐻)~(80,80), (𝑥2,𝐻 , 2𝑥2,𝐻)~(80,80), (2𝑦3,𝐻 , 𝑦3,𝐻)~(80,80), (𝑥4,𝐻, 0)~(80,80). 
Figure 3.6 presents those indifference relations in the (𝑥, 𝑦) space, as OA, OB, 
OC and OD for the lower stake, and O’A’, O’B’, O’C’ and O’D’ for the higher 
stake. Those indifference relations imply eight ARSs, denoted by 𝑟𝑗,𝑘, where 𝑗 =
1,2,3,4, 𝑘 = 𝐿, 𝐻.  
 
Figure 3.6: Testing Hypotheses by Comparing ARSs and Ratios of ARSs 
The eight ARSs have variation in three aspects. First, half of the ARSs are for 
the lower stake (when 𝑘 = 𝐿), and the other half for the higher stake (when 𝑘 =
𝐻). Therefore, it is possible to identify the magnitude effect. Second, half of the 
ARSs are between a balanced profile and an unbalanced one in the interior (when 
𝑗 = 2,3), and the other half are between a balanced profile and a single dated 
reward (when 𝑗 = 1,4). Hence, it is possible to test the all-sooner effect, and to 
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test the overall convexity and the convexity in the interior, respectively. Third, 
half of the ARSs are in the future-leaning domain (when 𝑗 = 1,2), and the other 
half in the present-leaning domain (when 𝑗 = 3,4). Thus, the GDF and EIS in the 
interior can be measured.  
Each choice list consists of 30 rows. Each of the four lists in the future-leaning 
domain (i.e. 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑘 = 𝐿,𝐻 ) starts with a row implying an ARS a bit 
lower than 0.5 and ends with a row with a dominated option. The implied ARSs 
of the rows in between are increasing, and are the same in the four lists. In contrast, 
each of the four lists in the present-leaning domain (i.e. 𝑗 = 3,4 and 𝑘 = 𝐿, 𝐻) 
starts with a row implying an ARS a bit higher than 2 and ends with a row with a 
dominated option. The implied ARSs of the rows in between are decreasing, and 
are the same in the four lists. The lists in the future-leaning domain and those in 
the present-leaning domain are symmetric to the diagonal of the space. (See 
Appendix 3.C for all parameters used in the eight lists.) Figure 3.7 displays the 
240 choice problems in the (𝑥, 𝑦) space. Each choice problem is represented by 
a colored line segment, of which the two endpoints stand for the two options.  




Figure 3.7: Binary Choice Problems Used in the Experiment 
The comparability between the four lists within a domain (future-leaning or 
present-leaning) and the symmetry between the two domains make it possible to 
test the all-sooner effect and the magnitude effect simply by comparing the ARSs 
identified from the choice lists.  
In principle, subjects need to make 30 choices in each list. However, we 
explicitly point out to subjects that in each list, one option is fixed and the other 
is getting worse as one moves down the list. Thereby, once a subject chooses the 
varying option in one row, we point out that she should also prefer the varying 
option in all preceding rows, and the program automatically selects the varying 
option in those rows. We do the same thing for choosing the fixed option. Figure 
3.2 displays what happens if a subject chooses an option in a row. By imposing 
such a mechanism, we rule out the possibility of multiple switching.  
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The order of the eight lists are randomized in two aspects: from the sooner 
boundary to the later boundary or vice versa, and from the lower stake to the 
higher stake or vice versa. Subjects can switch between lists at any moment, 
regardless of whether the current list is finished. Choices are automatically stored 
when one switches to another list. Therefore, subjects can easily make 
comparisons across lists if they like. Choices can be submitted only if all the 240 
decisions in the eight lists are completed.  
The experimental payments have two components. First, all subjects receive a 
€3 participation fee on each of the two dates, 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. Second, each subject 
has a 10 percent chance to receive earnings depending on choices.  
The earnings depending on choices are determined by a random incentive 
scheme with both between-subject and within-subject randomization. Prior to the 
decision-making stage, each subject is randomly given a lottery number, ranging 
from 0 to 9. At the end of each session, one of the subjects throws a ten-sided die 
in front of all subjects in that session. Subjects who have a lottery number 
identical to the die roll receive the earnings depending on choices. For each of 
them, one choice is randomly selected to be realized, and the amounts of money 
in that choice are added to the participation fees on the two dates, respectively. 
The between-subject randomization makes it possible to use high-stake rewards, 
and hence the magnitude effect can be investigated. The within-subject 
randomization makes all choices incentivized and it helps avoid wealth effect and 
hedging.  
For a real-stake experiment on intertemporal choices, it is important to equalize 
the transaction costs as well as the credibility of payments across periods. For this 
purpose, we provide an equal amount of participation fees on both the payment 
dates, and the participation fees and the earnings depending on choices are both 
delivered by bank transfer. Thus, the payment tools are the same for the two 
payments, and subjects need to receive money twice regardless of their choices. 
A survey in Sun and Potters (2016) shows that bank transfer is as good as cash in 
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terms of liquidity to Dutch university students. Therefore, subjects have reasons 
to believe that they will receive the payments on time and then the money can be 
used immediately. Moreover, we provide each subject a payment reminder card, 
which records the amounts and the dates of the payments, as well as the contact 
information of the experimenter. This should further increase the credibility of 
the payments.  
The experiment was conducted at the CentERlab, Tilburg University in 
September of 2017.26 114 students of the university participated in one of the 
eight sessions. One session took an hour on average. At the start of each session, 
the experimenter read the instructions aloud in front of all subjects. Then subjects 
made choices in a zTree program (Fischbacher, 2007). 12 subjects got the 
earnings depending on decisions, which averaged €82.46. The overall average 
earning was €14.68.  
3.4.2 Analyses 
We address our three questions based on the eight ARSs, 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 , 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4, 𝑘 =
𝐿, 𝐻.  
The first question is whether the EIS is larger for higher stakes. Formally, the 





















 correspond to the slope of O’B’ and that of 
O’C’, respectively. Then the EIS is larger for the higher stake if the indifference 
curve between B’ and C’ is less convex than that between B and C.  
The second question is whether the GDF is larger for a higher stake. Formally, 
the GDF is larger for the higher stake than for the lower stake if  
                                                        




(3.11) √𝑟2,𝐿𝑟3,𝐿 < √𝑟2,𝐻𝑟3,𝐻.  
Here, √𝑟2,𝐿𝑟3,𝐿 is a local estimate of the GDF for the lower stake. In Figure 3.6, 
the GDF is larger for the higher stake than for the lower stake if the curve B’C’ 
is on average flatter than the curve BC.  
The third question concerns the existence of the all-sooner effect. The intuition 
is that people are less patient when they are choosing between a pure sooner 
reward and a mixed profile than between two mixed profiles. Formally, the all-
sooner effect exists when the stake is low if  
(3.12) 𝑟4,𝐿 < 𝑟3,𝐿 .  






 correspond to the slope of OD and that of OC, 
respectively. If OD is steeper than OC, the all-sooner effect exists when the stake 
is low. The same test applies to the indifference curve with the higher stake. If 
O’D’ is steeper than O’C’, the all-sooner effect exists when the stake is high.  
3.5 Results 
Each of the 114 subjects made 240 choices in eight choice lists. Two subjects 
never switched in any list, and their choices are not consistent across lists. They 
apparently did not understand the task, and hence we remove their choices from 
the sample. Five other subjects chose a dominated option at least once. We also 
rule out their choices.  
Among the remaining 107 subjects, 24 of them (22 percent) always behave as 
if they maximize the total amount without discounting.27 Those subjects are 
likely to be people who fully integrate experimental rewards with their lifelong 
                                                        
27 Since the minimum positive annual rate of return in our design is 11.6 percent, which is much higher 
than the market interest rate, a subject who discounts money exponentially with the market interest rate 
will also make choices as if they are maximizing the total amount. One concern about the measurement 
method is that the specific design might have induced some subjects to use the heuristic of choosing the 
option with the largest total amount. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish people who are induced to be 
total-amount-maximizers from those who are truly (approximately) total-amount-maximizers. But given 
the fraction being 22%, which is much smaller than 38% in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), we expect the 
problem to be less severe than the CTB method (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a).  
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wealth. Since those people present no magnitude effect nor all-sooner effect, we 
focus on the remaining 83 subjects throughout this section. All tests we performed 
are unaffected by the exclusion of total-amount maximizers.  
Given the often-observed heterogeneity in preferences, we do not “force” all 
subjects to have the same preference and estimate the “representative” preference. 
Instead, we perform within-subject comparisons (e.g. between the slope of OC 
and that of OD) so that the three questions are addressed in a way which allows 
subjects to have different preferences (e.g. OC and OD can be different across 
subjects).28  
Throughout we treat censored observations as extreme values (i.e. zero or 
infinity ARS). Since only a small fraction of choices are censored (5 percent) and 
the signed rank test only relies on the rank, we expect censoring has limited effect 
on our results.  
3.5.1 Comparability with Previous Studies 
Before we address our main questions, we first check the validity of our dataset 
by examining if several stylized facts can be observed in our dataset.  
One pattern established in the literature is that people are indifferent between 
a smaller pure sooner reward and a larger pure later reward (see Frederick et al. 
2002 for a review). In other words, the monetary discount factor is less than one.29 
Formally,  
                                                        
28 We perform sign tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The sign test has the advantage of allowing 
heterogeneity in the size of the effect being tested. The Wilcoxon signed rank test has an advantage in 
power. The results of the two tests are always consistent in our study, suggesting that our findings are 
robust.  
29 In a statistical test, noise is taken into account. Thereby, strictly speaking, we are testing whether the 
monetary discount factor is more likely to be less than one than to be greater than one. Similar arguments 












We thus test it in our dataset Table 3.2 shows the monetary discount factors for 
the lower stake and for the higher stake, respectively. The medians are less than 
one, confirming that subjects exhibit impatience in choices between single dated 
rewards. 
Table 3.2: Monetary Discount Factors between Single Dated Rewards 
Notes: Two-sided sign tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests on the logarithm of the 
monetary discount factors for the lower stake and for the higher stake, respectively. 
The null hypothesis is that the monetary discount factor is equal to one. Censored 
observations are treated as extreme values (zero or infinity ARS). ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
The second stylized fact is the magnitude effect over single dated rewards: 
people have a larger monetary discount factor for higher stakes. Formally, it 
means 
We also test it with our data, and the results are presented in Table 3.3. The median 
ratio of the monetary discount factors for the higher stake to that for the lower 
stake is greater than one. Thus, the magnitude effect on the monetary discount 
rate is significant, which is consistent with previous evidence.  
 
Monetary discount factor 









Monetary discount factor 









Median 0.896 0.947 
#(?̂?𝑘
𝑚 < 1) 65 55 
#(?̂?𝑘
𝑚 = 1) 15 25 
#(?̂?𝑘
𝑚 > 1) 3 3 
Sign test:  p = 0.000*** p = 0.000*** 
Wilcoxon signed 
rank test: 
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Third, in their parametric estimation with a classic discounting model, 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) obtained a discount factor less than one. Since 
the discount factor in a classic discounting model corresponds to the GDF in a 
general case, we examine if the GDF in our dataset is on average less than one. 
Table 3.4 displays the estimates of the GDFs at the two magnitudes. The medians 
at both magnitudes are less than one, which is consistent with the previous finding.  
Table 3.3: Magnitude Effect on the Monetary Discount Factor 
Notes: Two-sided sign test and Wilcoxon signed rank test on the logarithm of the ratio 
of the monetary discount factor for the higher stake to that for the lower stake. The 
null hypothesis is that the monetary discount factors are equal for the two stakes. 
Censored observations are treated as extreme values (zero or infinity ARS), and 
indeterminate forms are dropped. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent 
level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
  
 
Ratio of the monetary discount factor 




















𝑚 < 1) 21 
Sign test:  p = 0.004*** 




Table 3.4: Generalized Discount Factors 
Notes: Two-sided sign tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests on the logarithm of the 
generalized discount factors for the lower stake and for the higher stake, respectively. 
The GDFs are estimated as the geometric mean of the ARSs in the interior. The null 
hypothesis is that the GDF is equal to one. Censored observations are treated as 
extreme values (zero or infinity ARS). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 
percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
Fourth, experiments using intertemporal profiles found that the interior part of 
an indifference curve is convex (Cheung, 2015a) or the entire indifference curve 
is on average convex (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a; Sun and Potters, 2016). We 
thereby test if it is also the case in our dataset. Table 3.5 shows the tests on 
convexity. The second and third columns are about the convexity of the lower-
stake indifference curve. The second column presents the ratio between the two 
ARSs in the interior, which is a measure of convexity in the interior. Given that 
the ratio is on average greater than one, the interior part of the lower-stake 
indifference curve is convex. The third column presents the ratio of the two ARSs 
between the balanced profile and the two boundaries, which is a measure of 
average convexity for the entire indifference curve. Since the ratio is greater than 
one, the lower-stake indifference curve is on average convex. The fourth and fifth 
columns show the higher-stake case. The indifference curve in the interior is still 
 
Generalized discount factor for 




Generalized discount factor 




Median 0.896 0.947 
#(?̂?𝑘 < 1) 48 51 
#(?̂?𝑘 = 1) 29 23 
#(?̂?𝑘 > 1) 6 9 




p = 0.000*** p = 0.000*** 
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convex, but no evidence shows that the entire curve on average is convex. The 
fact that the indifference curve with the higher stake is on average linear is 
consistent with the results from the parametric estimation by Sun and Potters 
(2016).  
Table 3.5: Convexity of Indifference Curves in the Interior and Overall 
Notes: Ratios of two ARSs in the interior as a measure of convexity in the interior, 
and ratios of two ARSs between a balanced profile and the two boundaries as a 
measure of average convexity of the entire indifference curve. The indifference curve 
is convex if the ratio is greater than one. Two-sided sign tests and Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests on the logarithm of the measures. The null hypothesis is that the 
measurement of convexity is equal to one, meaning that the indifference curve is 
linear. Censored observations are treated as extreme values (zero or infinity ARS). 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
Given that all the results replicate the stylized facts found in the literature, we 
have reason to believe that our design did not bias preferences in a systematic 
way.  
Ratios of two ARSs as 
measures of convexity 





























< 1) 14 17 20 24 
Sign test:  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.013** 0.350 




3.5.2 Main Results 
In this subsection, we address the three questions regarding the two channels 
of the magnitude effect and the all-sooner effect.  
First, we test if the EIS is larger for higher stakes. The EIS is measured by the 
ratio of the two ARSs in the interior. The larger the measure, the more convex the 
indifference curve is, and the smaller the EIS is. Figure 3.8 shows the 
distributions of the measures of convexity for the lower stake and for the higher 
stake, respectively. The measure is smaller for the higher stake, suggesting that 
the EIS is larger for the higher stake. We then perform formal tests on the 
measures for the two different stakes. Table 3.6 presents the results of the tests. 
The ratio between the measures of convexity is less than one, implying that the 
indifference curve is less convex for the higher stake, or equivalently, the EIS is 
larger for the higher stake.  
 
Figure 3.8: Distributions of the Measures of Convexity for the Lower Stake and for 
the Higher Stake 
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Table 3.6: Magnitude Effect on the Elasticities of Intertemporal Substitution 
Notes: Two-sided sign test and Wilcoxon signed rank test on the logarithm of the ratio 
of the measure of convexity for the higher stake to that for the lower stake. The EIS 
is larger for a higher stake if the ratio is less than one. The null hypothesis is that the 
ratio is equal to one, meaning that the indifference curve for the lower stake and that 
for the higher stake are equally convex. Censored observations are treated as extreme 
values (zero or infinity ARS). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent 
level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
Second, we test if the GDF is also larger for higher stakes. The GDF is 
measured by the geometric average of the two ARSs in the interior. Figure 3.9 
shows the distributions of the GDFs for the lower stake and for the higher stake, 
respectively. The GDF seems to be larger for the higher stake, but it is not clear 
if it is significant. Table 3.7 presents the result of the test. The ratio of the GDF 
for the higher stake to that at the lower stake is not significantly greater than 
one.30 Thereby, we find no evidence that the GDF is larger for higher stakes.  
                                                        
30 We perform a power analysis. With the alternative hypothesis that the proportion is 0.3, the rejection 
rate is 92%. Thus, our test is not underpowered.  























> 1) 23 
Sign test:  0.019** 





Figure 3.9: Distributions of the Generalized Discount Factors for the Lower Stake 
and for the Higher Stake 
Table 3.7: Magnitude Effect on the Generalized Discount Factor 
Notes: Two-sided sign test and Wilcoxon signed rank test on the logarithm of the ratio 
of the GDF for the higher stake to that for the lower stake. The null hypothesis is that 
the ratio is equal to one. Censored observations are treated as extreme values (zero or 
infinity ARS), and indeterminate forms are dropped. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
















< 1) 24 
Sign test:  p = 0.155 
Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0.134 
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From Figure 3.9, we also notice that there are some subjects who have an ARS 
of zero for the lower stake but have an ARS around one for the higher stake. In 
other words, they are extremely impatient when the stake is lower, but patient 
when the stake is higher. This is consistent with the magnitude-dependent 
discounting model by Noor (2011). The existence of extreme subjects suggests 
that there is heterogeneity in how GDF changes with the stake.  
The results on the two channels of the magnitude effect imply that the 
magnitude of outcomes affects choices mainly through the perceived fungibility 
of rewards across periods. In other words, when the magnitude is larger, people 
care more about the discounted sum of amounts and less about smoothing. On 
the other hand, there is no evidence showing that the general patience is higher 
when the magnitude is larger, though heterogeneity seems to exist.  
Our results about the magnitude effect have implications for estimating 
preferences. If researchers estimate preferences with low-stake choices, omitting 
the magnitude effect leads to an overestimation of the utility curvature.  
Third, we look at the all-sooner effect. The all-sooner effect exists if people are 
less patient when choosing between a pure sooner reward and a mixed profile 
than when choosing between two mixed profiles, i.e. if the ARS to the sooner 
boundary is less than that in the interior. Figure 3.10(a) shows the distributions 
of the two ARSs for the lower stake. The ARS to the sooner boundary is on 
average less than that in the interior, suggesting the existence of the all-sooner 
effect. Figure 3.10(b) shows the distributions of the two ARSs for the higher stake. 
The two ARSs are about the same. We then perform tests on the ratios of the two 
ARSs to check if they are different from one. Table 3.8 shows the results of the 
tests. For the lower stake, most subjects have a smaller ARS to the sooner 
boundary than in the interior, which implies the existence of the all-sooner effect. 
For the higher stake, the difference between the two ARSs are smaller. This is 
consistent with the fixed-cost-of-waiting model by Benhabib et al. (2010) 




than a pure sooner reward is less pronounced for higher stakes, and hence people 
exhibit less extra impatience when a pure sooner reward is available.  
The existence of the all-sooner effect also has implications for both theoretical 
and empirical studies. First, it implies that impatience concerns more than 
discounting. Most of the impatience observed in choices between single dated 
rewards is probably caused both by a proportional cost of delaying rewards 
(discounting) and by a disproportional cost (the all-sooner effect). The two 
channels have different effects on choices between general intertemporal profiles. 
Second, the all-sooner effect implies a violation of convexity near the sooner 
boundary. The intuition is that people have a preference for pure sooner rewards, 
which dominates the preference for smoothing when the degree of smoothing is 
low anyway (since almost all rewards are on the sooner date). Third, if 
researchers estimate preferences with some single dated rewards, omitting the all-
sooner effect leads to an overestimation of the discount rate, because part of the 
impatience is actually due to the all-sooner effect. In the meantime, it leads to an 
underestimation of the utility curvature because the average curvature is lowered 
by the non-convexity resulted from the all-sooner effect.  
Our evidence of the all-sooner effect combined with our evidence of convexity 
shows that existing evidence of convexity in the interior and overall is not 
conflicting with the all-sooner effect; the all-sooner effect only leads to a 
violation of convexity near the sooner boundary, while in the interior and overall 
indifference curves are still convex in our dataset.  
The result that we do not find a magnitude effect on the generalized discount 
factor does not contradict the previous evidence of the magnitude effect on the 
discount rate in Sun and Potters (2016). In Sun and Potters (2016), the discount 
rate is measured parametrically without considering the all-sooner effect, and 
hence it could be a mixture of the real discount rate and the all-sooner effect. It is 
possible that the discount rate does not change with stakes while the all-sooner 
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effect is less salient when outcomes are larger. Our result of the all-sooner effect 
is consistent with this story.  
 
(a) For the lower stake 
 
(b) For the higher stake 
Figure 3.10: Distributions of the Average Rates of Substitution in the Interior and to 




Table 3.8: The All-Sooner Effect 
Notes: Two-sided sign tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests on the logarithm of the 
ratio of the ARSs in the interior to that to the sooner boundary. The null hypothesis is 
that the ratio is equal to one. The all-sooner effect exists if the ratio is less than one. 
Censored observations are treated as extreme values (zero or infinity ARS), and 
indeterminate forms are dropped. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent 
level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
We compare our results with the predictions of existing models considered in 
Table 3.1. First, given that we find strong evidence of the all-sooner effect, the 
fixed-cost-of-waiting model has an advantage in predicting such a behavior. If 
people behave as if they incur a fixed cost whenever they forgo a pure sooner 
reward, they appear less patient when a pure sooner reward is available. Second, 
only one model predicts an increase in the EIS with the stake: the mental 
accounting version of Fudenberg and Levine’s (2006) bank-nightclub model. The 
intuition is that people perceive small rewards as extra consumption in the short-
run, which is less fungible, while they perceive large rewards primarily as 
contributions to life-long savings, which is highly fungible. Third, since we do 
not find evidence that the GDF is larger for higher stakes, most models considered 
are consistent with our results in this term. As mentioned above, for subjects who 
are extremely impatient for the lower stake but patient for the higher stake, the 
Ratios of the ARS to the sooner 
boundary to that in the interior as 
measures of the all-sooner effect 






















> 1) 15 20 
Sign test:  0.000*** 0.058* 
Wilcoxon signed rank test: 0.000*** 0.039** 
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magnitude-dependent discounting model by Noor (2011) can give an explanation. 
Nevertheless, none of the models under consideration gives a uniform account 
for the empirical patterns in all of the three aspects.  
3.5.3 A Simple and Flexible Model that Captures All Findings 
We propose a simple model which can accommodate all the characteristics 
found in our results. The model is  
where 𝛼 is the utility curvature parameter satisfying 𝛼 < 1 , 𝛿0 and 𝛿∞ are 
two discount factors satisfying 0 ≤ 𝛿0 ≤ 𝛿∞ ≤ 1, 𝐶 is a fixed cost of waiting 
satisfying 𝐶 > 0, and 𝜇 is a weight satisfying 𝜇 ∈ [0,1].  
The model has an intuitive interpretation: the utility function in each period 
consists of a linear part and a concave part, representing the goals of life-long 
wealth maximization and short-run utility maximization, respectively. 𝜇 is the 
weight of the myopic motivation. As the stake increases, the concave part 
becomes relatively less important, and hence the sooner reward and the later 
reward become more fungible (i.e. the EIS increases). On the other hand, the 
short-run part is discounted more than the long-run part (𝛿0 ≤ 𝛿∞), so that when 
the stake increases, the effective weight of the later reward becomes higher (i.e. 
the GDF increases).  
The model represents a preference with the following characteristics: i) it has 
convex indifference curves in the interior; ii) the all-sooner effect exists, and its 
effect on the ARS is decreasing; iii) the EIS first decreases and then increases to 
∞ as the stake increases from 0 to ∞; iv) the GDF changes monotonically from 
a value between 𝛿0 and 𝛿∞ to 𝛿∞ as the stake increases from 0 to ∞. (See 
Appendix 3.B for a proof.)  
(3.15) 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = {






, if 𝑦 = 0
(1 − 𝜇)𝑥 + 𝜇
(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼
𝛼
+ 𝛿∞(1 − 𝜇)𝑦 + 𝛿0𝜇
(𝑦 + 𝜔)𝛼
𝛼
− 𝐶, if 𝑦 > 0
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The model is flexible to accommodate different types of decision makers. By 
assuming 𝐶 = 0, the all-sooner effect disappears. By further assuming 𝜇 = 0, it 
turns into a discounting model with linear utility functions, and hence can 
represent the preference of total-amount maximizers. With 𝛿0 = 𝛿∞, the model 
represents the preference of people whose GDF is constant. With 𝐶 = 0, 𝜇 = 1 
and 𝜔 = 0, the model represents the preference of people whose EIS is constant.  
Lastly, the model is tractable, with simple functional forms of utilities and 
marginal utilities, and hence can be easily estimated in empirical studies.  
Given the consistency with empirical findings, the flexibility and the 
tractability, the model can be used to estimate preferences and predict choices in 
future empirical studies, especially in those involve both single dated rewards and 
mixed profiles and have variation in stakes.  
3.6 Conclusion and Discussions 
We develop a simple method for measuring intertemporal preferences. The 
method is parameter-free, incentive-compatible and independent of time horizon 
effects. It requires weak assumptions on the preferences to be measured, and 
hence it can be used to study a variety of models.  
We apply the method to measure preferences over two-outcome intertemporal 
profiles. The measurement is used for testing a few existing models of 
intertemporal choices in a parameter-free way. Those models vary in their 
predictions on how choices between intertemporal profiles change with the stake 
(the magnitude effect) and whether people have a preference for pure sooner 
rewards over mixed profiles (the all-sooner effect). We find three predominant 
characteristics. First, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is larger for 
higher stakes, meaning that people feel monetary rewards are more fungible 
across time when the magnitude of the rewards is larger. Second, we do not find 
evidence that the generalized discount factor is larger for higher stakes, 
suggesting that on average discounting is not affected by the magnitude of 
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rewards. Third, we find evidence of the all-sooner effect, meaning that people 
have a preference for pure sooner rewards.  
Our results provide implications for the practice of preference elicitation in 
scientific studies and prescriptive consultation. Our finding about the magnitude 
effect suggests that estimating preferences with low-stake tasks leads to an 
overestimation of the utility curvature if the magnitude effect is omitted. Our 
finding of the all-sooner effect suggests that measuring preferences using choices 
between single dated rewards without considering the all-sooner effect leads to 
an overestimation of the discount rate and an underestimation of the utility 
curvature. The simple model we provide can be used to correct for such biases in 
empirical work where both single dated rewards and intertemporal profiles are 
involved, or choices of various magnitudes are included.  
Although we fix the time points of the two outcomes and focus on how choices 
are affected by changes in outcomes in this study, our measurement method can 
be used when time points are varied. By measuring discount factors for different 
front-end delays and delays, it is possible to measure the entire discount function. 
Meanwhile, it is easy to combine our empirical findings with the findings about 
the time horizon effects. For instance, in our simple model, 𝛿0 and 𝛿∞ can be 
functions decreasing in 𝜏 if the discount function is only sensitive in the delay 
(Read, 2001; Dohmen et al., 2017). If the front-end delay also matters, 𝛿0 and 
𝛿∞ should also be applied to the first-period utility function, and all discount 
functions can be decreasing in the time distance from now.  
In this study we only measure preferences over two-outcome profiles, but our 
framework can be extended to profiles with any number of periods. In that case, 
the EIS and the GDF can be defined for any two consecutive periods. Are all the 
EISs increasing in the stake? Does the all-sooner effect occur whenever the 
choice is between a single dated reward at 𝑡𝑖 and a profile with rewards no 
earlier than 𝑡𝑖? Those are interesting questions that can be addressed in further 
studies.  
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A last observation concerns the non-monotonicity caused by the assumption of 
a fixed cost of waiting. The preference represented by the utility function is 
discontinuous and non-monotonic between the sooner boundary and the rest of 
the space. As a result, a pure sooner reward might be preferred to a mixed profile 
which dominates the former one. For instance, suppose 𝑈(30,0) = 𝑈(34,2) , 
which means the pure sooner reward (30,0) is as good as the profile (34,2). 
But this implies that (31,0)  is preferred to (34,2)  even though (31,0)  is 
dominated by (34,2) in quantity. By a thought experiment, it is hard to believe 
that subjects will ever choose the dominated option. This problem matters when 
choices with dominated options are involved. One way to solve this problem is 
to assume the preference to be “(𝑥1, 𝑦1) ≽ (𝑥2, 𝑦2) if and only if, either 𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥2 
and 𝑦1 ≥ 𝑦2 , or  (𝑥1 − 𝑥2)(𝑦1 − 𝑦2) < 0  and 𝑈(𝑥1, 𝑦1) ≥ 𝑈(𝑥2, 𝑦2) ”. In 
other words, a choice is made first by checking if one option dominates the other. 
Only if no domination exists, is the choice determined by the utility function. 
This decision-making rule, however, implies cyclicity. For instance, if 
𝑈(31,0) > 𝑈(30,0) = 𝑈(20,20) = 𝑈(34,2) > 𝑈(33,1), it holds that (31,0) ≻
(20,20) , (20,20) ≻ (33,1)  and (33,1) ≻ (31,0) . Given that cyclicity is 
observed in intertemporal choices (consider the subadditivity in discounting. See 
Read, 2001), the intransitive model should not be rejected without empirical 




APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
3.A Proofs of the Predictions of Various Existing 
Models 





ln𝜌(𝑥(𝑄, 𝑢), 𝑦(𝑄, 𝑢))
, 
where 𝑄 ≡ ln (
𝑥
𝑦
) and 𝑢 = 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦).  
If the intertemporal utility function is additively separable, it can be written as 
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑢1(𝑥) + 𝑢2(𝑦), 







The EIS is  









































If further, the preference is represented by a classic discounting model, the 
intertemporal utility function can be written as  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑢(𝑥) + 𝛿𝑢(𝑦). 
Then the GDF is  
𝛿(𝑦) = 𝛿, 
and the EIS is  
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3.A.1 Power Utility Function and Magnitude-Independent Discount 
Factor 








where 𝛼 ≤ 1. The GDF is  
𝛿(𝑦) = 𝛿, 





Hence, neither the GDF nor the EIS changes with the stake.  
3.A.2 Power Utility Function with Positive Background 
Consumption and Magnitude-Independent Discount Factor 




(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼 + 𝛿
1
𝛼
(𝑦 + 𝜔)𝛼 
where 𝛼 ≤ 1 and 𝜔 > 0. The GDF is still  
𝛿(𝑦) = 𝛿, 























 are both decreasing in the stake, and  
(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼−1𝑥
(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼−1𝑥 + 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝜔)𝛼−1𝑦
+
𝛿(𝑦 + 𝜔)𝛼−1𝑦
(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼−1𝑥 + 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝜔)𝛼−1𝑦
= 1, 
the EIS is decreasing in the stake. For any 
𝑥
𝑦
= 𝜆 > 0,  













the EIS decreases from +∞ to 
1
1−𝛼
 as the stake increases.  
3.A.3 Exponential Utility Function and Magnitude-Independent 
Discount Factor 
The preference is represented by the intertemporal utility function  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = [1 − exp(−𝑥)] + 𝛿[1 − exp(−𝑦)]. 
The GDF is again 
𝛿(𝑦) = 𝛿, 
and the EIS is  
(𝑥, 𝑦) = [𝑦
𝑥 exp(−𝑥)
𝑥 exp(−𝑥) + 𝛿𝑦 exp(−𝑦)
+ 𝑥
𝛿𝑦 exp(−𝑦)




Since   
𝑥 exp(−𝑥)
𝑥 exp(−𝑥) + 𝛿𝑦 exp(−𝑦)
+
𝛿𝑦 exp(−𝑦)
𝑥 exp(−𝑥) + 𝛿𝑦 exp(−𝑦)
= 1, 
the EIS is decreasing in the stake. For any 
𝑥
𝑦
= 𝜆 > 0,  
lim
𝑦→0




(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0, 
the EIS decreases from +∞ to 0 as the stake increases.  
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3.A.4 Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) Sub-Proportional Utility 
Function and Magnitude-Independent Discount Factor 
The preference is represented by the intertemporal utility function  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑢(𝑥) + 𝛿𝑢(𝑦) 
where 𝑢 is sub-proportional, i.e.  






The GDF is still  
𝛿(𝑦) = 𝛿. 
The EIS is  













The relation between the EIS and the stake depends on the functional form of 
𝑢(∙). For instance, if the period utility function is a power utility function with 
positive background consumption, as in Appendix 3.A.2 (it is easy to show its 
sub-proportionality), the EIS is decreasing in the stake. If, alternatively, the 
period utility function is  















is decreasing in 𝑥. In this case, the EIS is 
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is decreasing in 𝑥, the EIS is increasing in the stake.   
3.A.5 A Mental Accounting Version of Fudenberg and Levine’s 
(2006) Bank-Nightclub Model 
As introduced in Section 3.3.3, the model is a classic discounting model with 



































where 𝛾 ≥ 0, 𝛼 < 1 and 𝜔 > 0.  
Since it is a classic discounting model, the GDF is a constant, 𝛿.  
Regarding the EIS, first notice that because the utility function is separated into 
two cases, the EIS is separated into four cases, depending if 𝑥 and 𝑦 are above 
or below the cutoff, respectively. For simplicity, we only consider the EIS at 
balanced profiles:  












































𝑧 − 𝛾(𝑧 + 𝜔)𝛼−2𝑧




It can be seen that the EIS in the first case is the same as the classic discounting 
model with a power utility function and a positive background consumption, 
which is decreasing in the stake and converging to 
1
1−𝛼
. In the second case, the 
EIS is decreasing in the stake, and converging to 
1
1−𝛼
, too. At the cutoff, the EIS 
in the first case is  
















































Hence, there is an upward jump in the EIS at the cutoff.  
3.A.6 Parametric Form of Noor’s (2011) Magnitude-Dependent 
Discounting Model 
The preference is represented by the utility function  











where 𝛽 < 𝛼 < 1 and 𝑑 < 1. The function is additively separable. The first-
order derivative w.r.t. 𝑦 is 








The second-order derivative w.r.t. 𝑦 is  
𝑈22(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑑
𝑡2























































The denominator is decreasing in 𝑦 , while the numerator is increasing in 𝑦 . 















 is increasing in 𝑥, and changing from −∞ to 1 − 𝛼.  

















which is increasing in 𝑦 and changes from 0 to 1.  
The EIS is  






















the EIS decreases from 0 to −∞, and then decreases from +∞ to 0. It means 
that, as the stake increases from 0 to ∞, the indifference curve changes from 
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3.A.7 Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter’s (2010) Fixed-cost-of-waiting 
Model 
The preference is represented by a utility function  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = {
1
𝛼






𝑦𝛼 − 𝐶, if 𝑦 > 0
 
where 𝐶 > 0 is a fixed cost.  
The model is the same as the classic discounting model with a power utility 
function. Therefore, neither the GDF nor the EIS changes with the stake. The only 
difference is that this model predicts the all-sooner effect. To see this, we derive 
the ARS between a balanced profile, (𝑧, 𝑧), and a pure sooner reward, (𝑥, 0), 










which implies  
𝑥 = [(1 + 𝛿)𝑧𝛼 − 𝛼𝐶]
1
𝛼. 
Then the ARS between the two profiles is  











As a benchmark, the ARS between a balanced profile and a mixed profile very 
close to the sooner boundary is  
lim
𝜆→∞
𝐴𝑅𝑆(𝑧, 𝑧, 𝜆) = [(1 + 𝛿)]
1
𝛼 − 1. 
Apparently, the ARS to the sooner boundary is less than that to a mixed profile 
near the boundary, and hence the all-sooner effect exists.  
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When the stake increases (i.e. 𝑧 increases), the difference between the two 
ARSs is decreasing and converges to 0, which implies that the all-sooner effect 
is less pronounced for a higher stake.  
3.A.8 A Simple Version of Holden and Quiggin’s (2017) Zooming 
Model 
Holden and Quiggin (2017) propose the zooming model. The main idea is that 
the background consumption is increasing in the stake. The general model is  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑢(𝑥 + 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)) + 𝛿𝑢(𝑦 + 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)). 
In their study, they assumed the background consumption is a function of the pure 
later reward in a binary choice problem, i.e. 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑔(𝑦) . We adapt their 
model to binary choices between two-outcome profiles, and hence we assume the 
background consumption is a function of the total amount of a profile. In the 
meantime, we assume a simple period utility function, and hence the preference 
is represented by  
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑦) =








where 𝛽 < 𝛼 < 1.  
We derive the first and second derivatives:  
𝑈1 = (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1(1 + 𝐵1) + 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵1 
𝑈2 = (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵1 + 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1(1 + 𝐵1) 
𝑈11 = (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−2(𝛼 − 1)(1 + 𝐵1)
2 + (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵2
+ 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−2(𝛼 − 1)𝐵1
2 + 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵2 
𝑈12 = (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−2(𝛼 − 1)𝐵1(1 + 𝐵1) + (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵2
+ 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−2(𝛼 − 1 )(1 + 𝐵1)𝐵1 + 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵2 
𝑈22 = (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−2(𝛼 − 1)𝐵1
2 + (𝑥 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵2
+  𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−2(𝛼 − 1)(1 + 𝐵1)
2 + 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐵0)
𝛼−1𝐵2 
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where 𝐵0 = 𝑏(𝑥 + 𝑦)
𝛽 , 𝐵1 = 𝑏𝛽(𝑥 + 𝑦)
𝛽−1 , and 𝐵2 = 𝑏𝛽(𝛽 − 1)(𝑥 +
𝑦)𝛽−2.  
The GDF is  
𝛿(𝑦) =
𝛿 + 𝐵1 + 𝛿𝐵1
1 + 𝐵1 + 𝛿𝐵1
, 
which is decreasing in 𝑦 and changes from 1 to 𝛿.  












































It is hard to see the monotonicity analytically. We thereby investigate it 
numerically. By experimenting with the parameters in the following ranges: 𝛽 ∈








3.B Proofs of the Predictions of the Simple Model 










, if 𝑦 = 0
(1 − 𝜇)𝑥 + 𝜇
(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼
𝛼
+ 𝛿∞(1 − 𝜇)𝑦 + 𝛿0𝜇
(𝑦 + 𝜔)𝛼
𝛼
− 𝐶, if 𝑦 > 0
 
where 𝜇 ∈ [0,1], 0 ≤ 𝛿0 ≤ 𝛿∞ ≤ 1, 𝛼 < 1, 𝐶 > 0.   
In this section, we show that the model has the following characteristics: (i) the 
indifference curves are convex in the interior; (ii) the all-sooner effect exists, and 
its effect on the ARS is decreasing in the stake; (iii) the EIS first decreases and 
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then increases to ∞ as the stake increases from 0 to ∞; (iv) the GDF changes 
monotonically from 𝛿0 to 𝛿∞ as the stake increases from 0 to ∞.  
(i): Notice that the utility function is additively separable. Thereby, if each 
period utility function is concave in the interior, the indifference curves are 
convex in the interior. The second derivative of the first period utility function is  
−𝜇(1 − 𝛼)(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼−2 < 0. 
The second derivative of the second period utility function is  
−𝛿0𝜇(1 − 𝛼)(𝑦 + 𝜔)
𝛼−2 < 0. 
The convexity in the interior is thus proved.  
(ii): Since there is a fixed cost, the proof is the same as in Appendix 3.A.7. The 
all-sooner effect exists and its effect on the ARS is decreasing in the stake.  




= (1 − 𝛼)
𝜇(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼−2𝑥
1 − 𝜇 + 𝜇(𝑥 + 𝜔)𝛼−1
. 
It is first increasing and then decreasing in 𝑥 and converges to 0. Similarly, for 
the second period utility function, it holds that −
𝑈22𝑦
𝑈2
 is first increasing and then 
decreasing in 𝑦 and converges to 0. The EIS is thereby first decreasing and then 
increasing in the stake and converges to ∞. It means that the indifference curve 
is initially the same as that of a classic discounting model with power utility 
functions and positive background consumption, but then it becomes less concave 
as the stake becomes higher, and it converges to a straight line.  
(iv): The GDF is  
𝛿(𝑦) =
(1 − 𝜇)𝛿∞ + 𝜇𝛿0(𝑦 + 𝜔)
𝛼−1
1 − 𝜇 + 𝜇(𝑦 + 𝜔)𝛼−1
, 





(1 − 𝜇)𝛿∞ + 𝜇𝛿0𝜔
𝛼−1
1 − 𝜇 + 𝜇𝜔𝛼−1
 
which is a weighted average of 𝛿∞ and 𝛿0, and  





𝛿(𝑦) = 𝛿∞. □ 
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3.C Parameters Used in the Choice Lists 
Choice list 1: to the later boundary, for the lower stake 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 0.00 60.00 20.00 20.00  
2 0.00 56.80 20.00 20.00 1.92 
3 0.00 53.80 20.00 20.00 1.76 
4 0.00 52.40 20.00 20.00 1.66 
5 0.00 51.10 20.00 20.00 1.59 
6 0.00 49.80 20.00 20.00 1.52 
7 0.00 48.60 20.00 20.00 1.46 
8 0.00 47.40 20.00 20.00 1.40 
9 0.00 46.30 20.00 20.00 1.34 
10 0.00 45.20 20.00 20.00 1.29 
11 0.00 44.20 20.00 20.00 1.23 
12 0.00 43.20 20.00 20.00 1.18 
13 0.00 42.20 20.00 20.00 1.13 
14 0.00 41.30 20.00 20.00 1.09 
15 0.00 40.40 20.00 20.00 1.04 
16 0.00 39.60 20.00 20.00 1.00 
17 0.00 38.80 20.00 20.00 0.96 
18 0.00 38.00 20.00 20.00 0.92 
19 0.00 37.30 20.00 20.00 0.88 
20 0.00 36.60 20.00 20.00 0.85 
21 0.00 35.90 20.00 20.00 0.81 
22 0.00 34.60 20.00 20.00 0.76 
23 0.00 34.00 20.00 20.00 0.71 
24 0.00 33.40 20.00 20.00 0.69 
25 0.00 32.30 20.00 20.00 0.64 
26 0.00 31.80 20.00 20.00 0.60 
27 0.00 30.40 20.00 20.00 0.56 
28 0.00 29.20 20.00 20.00 0.49 
29 0.00 24.00 20.00 20.00 0.30 
30 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00  
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Choice list 2: to the interior in the future-leaning domain, for the lower stake 
 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 15.00 30.00 20.00 20.00  
2 14.80 29.60 20.00 20.00 1.92 
3 14.60 29.20 20.00 20.00 1.76 
4 14.50 29.00 20.00 20.00 1.66 
5 14.40 28.80 20.00 20.00 1.59 
6 14.30 28.60 20.00 20.00 1.52 
7 14.20 28.40 20.00 20.00 1.46 
8 14.10 28.20 20.00 20.00 1.40 
9 14.00 28.00 20.00 20.00 1.34 
10 13.90 27.80 20.00 20.00 1.29 
11 13.80 27.60 20.00 20.00 1.23 
12 13.70 27.40 20.00 20.00 1.18 
13 13.60 27.20 20.00 20.00 1.13 
14 13.50 27.00 20.00 20.00 1.09 
15 13.40 26.80 20.00 20.00 1.04 
16 13.30 26.60 20.00 20.00 1.00 
17 13.20 26.40 20.00 20.00 0.96 
18 13.10 26.20 20.00 20.00 0.92 
19 13.00 26.00 20.00 20.00 0.88 
20 12.90 25.80 20.00 20.00 0.85 
21 12.80 25.60 20.00 20.00 0.81 
22 12.70 25.40 20.00 20.00 0.76 
23 12.60 25.20 20.00 20.00 0.71 
24 12.50 25.00 20.00 20.00 0.69 
25 12.40 24.80 20.00 20.00 0.64 
26 12.30 24.60 20.00 20.00 0.60 
27 12.10 24.20 20.00 20.00 0.56 
28 11.90 23.80 20.00 20.00 0.49 
29 10.90 21.80 20.00 20.00 0.30 
30 10.00 20.00 20.00 20.00  
Chapter 3. Measuring Preferences over Intertemporal Profiles: Magnitude Effect and All-Sooner Effect 
118 
 
Choice list 3: to the interior in the present-leaning domain, for the lower stake 
 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 30.00 15.00 20.00 20.00  
2 29.60 14.80 20.00 20.00 0.52 
3 29.20 14.60 20.00 20.00 0.57 
4 29.00 14.50 20.00 20.00 0.60 
5 28.80 14.40 20.00 20.00 0.63 
6 28.60 14.30 20.00 20.00 0.66 
7 28.40 14.20 20.00 20.00 0.69 
8 28.20 14.10 20.00 20.00 0.71 
9 28.00 14.00 20.00 20.00 0.75 
10 27.80 13.90 20.00 20.00 0.78 
11 27.60 13.80 20.00 20.00 0.81 
12 27.40 13.70 20.00 20.00 0.85 
13 27.20 13.60 20.00 20.00 0.88 
14 27.00 13.50 20.00 20.00 0.92 
15 26.80 13.40 20.00 20.00 0.96 
16 26.60 13.30 20.00 20.00 1.00 
17 26.40 13.20 20.00 20.00 1.04 
18 26.20 13.10 20.00 20.00 1.09 
19 26.00 13.00 20.00 20.00 1.13 
20 25.80 12.90 20.00 20.00 1.18 
21 25.60 12.80 20.00 20.00 1.23 
22 25.40 12.70 20.00 20.00 1.31 
23 25.20 12.60 20.00 20.00 1.40 
24 25.00 12.50 20.00 20.00 1.46 
25 24.80 12.40 20.00 20.00 1.55 
26 24.60 12.30 20.00 20.00 1.66 
27 24.20 12.10 20.00 20.00 1.80 
28 23.80 11.90 20.00 20.00 2.04 
29 21.80 10.90 20.00 20.00 3.31 
30 20.00 10.00 20.00 20.00  
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Choice list 4: to the sooner boundary, for the lower stake 
 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 60.00 0.00 20.00 20.00  
2 56.80 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.52 
3 53.80 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.57 
4 52.40 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.60 
5 51.10 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.63 
6 49.80 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.66 
7 48.60 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.69 
8 47.40 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.71 
9 46.30 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.75 
10 45.20 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.78 
11 44.20 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.81 
12 43.20 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.85 
13 42.20 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.88 
14 41.30 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.92 
15 40.40 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.96 
16 39.60 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.00 
17 38.80 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.04 
18 38.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.09 
19 37.30 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.13 
20 36.60 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.18 
21 35.90 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.23 
22 34.60 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.31 
23 34.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.40 
24 33.40 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.46 
25 32.30 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.55 
26 31.80 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.66 
27 30.40 0.00 20.00 20.00 1.80 
28 29.20 0.00 20.00 20.00 2.04 
29 24.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 3.31 
30 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00  
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Choice list 5: to the later boundary, for the higher stake 
 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 0.00 240.00 80.00 80.00  
2 0.00 227.20 80.00 80.00 1.92 
3 0.00 215.20 80.00 80.00 1.76 
4 0.00 209.60 80.00 80.00 1.66 
5 0.00 204.40 80.00 80.00 1.59 
6 0.00 199.20 80.00 80.00 1.52 
7 0.00 194.40 80.00 80.00 1.46 
8 0.00 189.60 80.00 80.00 1.40 
9 0.00 185.20 80.00 80.00 1.34 
10 0.00 180.80 80.00 80.00 1.29 
11 0.00 176.80 80.00 80.00 1.23 
12 0.00 172.80 80.00 80.00 1.18 
13 0.00 168.80 80.00 80.00 1.13 
14 0.00 165.20 80.00 80.00 1.09 
15 0.00 161.60 80.00 80.00 1.04 
16 0.00 158.40 80.00 80.00 1.00 
17 0.00 155.20 80.00 80.00 0.96 
18 0.00 152.00 80.00 80.00 0.92 
19 0.00 149.20 80.00 80.00 0.88 
20 0.00 146.40 80.00 80.00 0.85 
21 0.00 143.60 80.00 80.00 0.81 
22 0.00 138.40 80.00 80.00 0.76 
23 0.00 136.00 80.00 80.00 0.71 
24 0.00 133.60 80.00 80.00 0.69 
25 0.00 129.20 80.00 80.00 0.64 
26 0.00 127.20 80.00 80.00 0.60 
27 0.00 121.60 80.00 80.00 0.56 
28 0.00 116.80 80.00 80.00 0.49 
29 0.00 96.00 80.00 80.00 0.30 
30 0.00 80.00 80.00 80.00  
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Choice list 6: to the interior in the future-leaning domain, for the higher stake 
 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 60.00 120.00 80.00 80.00  
2 59.20 118.40 80.00 80.00 1.92 
3 58.40 116.80 80.00 80.00 1.76 
4 58.00 116.00 80.00 80.00 1.66 
5 57.60 115.20 80.00 80.00 1.59 
6 57.20 114.40 80.00 80.00 1.52 
7 56.80 113.60 80.00 80.00 1.46 
8 56.40 112.80 80.00 80.00 1.40 
9 56.00 112.00 80.00 80.00 1.34 
10 55.60 111.20 80.00 80.00 1.29 
11 55.20 110.40 80.00 80.00 1.23 
12 54.80 109.60 80.00 80.00 1.18 
13 54.40 108.80 80.00 80.00 1.13 
14 54.00 108.00 80.00 80.00 1.09 
15 53.60 107.20 80.00 80.00 1.04 
16 53.20 106.40 80.00 80.00 1.00 
17 52.80 105.60 80.00 80.00 0.96 
18 52.40 104.80 80.00 80.00 0.92 
19 52.00 104.00 80.00 80.00 0.88 
20 51.60 103.20 80.00 80.00 0.85 
21 51.20 102.40 80.00 80.00 0.81 
22 50.80 101.60 80.00 80.00 0.76 
23 50.40 100.80 80.00 80.00 0.71 
24 50.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 0.69 
25 49.60 99.20 80.00 80.00 0.64 
26 49.20 98.40 80.00 80.00 0.60 
27 48.40 96.80 80.00 80.00 0.56 
28 47.60 95.20 80.00 80.00 0.49 
29 43.60 87.20 80.00 80.00 0.30 
30 40.00 80.00 80.00 80.00  
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Choice list 7: to the interior in the present-leaning domain, for the higher stake 
 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 120.00 60.00 80.00 80.00  
2 118.40 59.20 80.00 80.00 0.52 
3 116.80 58.40 80.00 80.00 0.57 
4 116.00 58.00 80.00 80.00 0.60 
5 115.20 57.60 80.00 80.00 0.63 
6 114.40 57.20 80.00 80.00 0.66 
7 113.60 56.80 80.00 80.00 0.69 
8 112.80 56.40 80.00 80.00 0.71 
9 112.00 56.00 80.00 80.00 0.75 
10 111.20 55.60 80.00 80.00 0.78 
11 110.40 55.20 80.00 80.00 0.81 
12 109.60 54.80 80.00 80.00 0.85 
13 108.80 54.40 80.00 80.00 0.88 
14 108.00 54.00 80.00 80.00 0.92 
15 107.20 53.60 80.00 80.00 0.96 
16 106.40 53.20 80.00 80.00 1.00 
17 105.60 52.80 80.00 80.00 1.04 
18 104.80 52.40 80.00 80.00 1.09 
19 104.00 52.00 80.00 80.00 1.13 
20 103.20 51.60 80.00 80.00 1.18 
21 102.40 51.20 80.00 80.00 1.23 
22 101.60 50.80 80.00 80.00 1.31 
23 100.80 50.40 80.00 80.00 1.40 
24 100.00 50.00 80.00 80.00 1.46 
25 99.20 49.60 80.00 80.00 1.55 
26 98.40 49.20 80.00 80.00 1.66 
27 96.80 48.40 80.00 80.00 1.80 
28 95.20 47.60 80.00 80.00 2.04 
29 87.20 43.60 80.00 80.00 3.31 
30 80.00 40.00 80.00 80.00  
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Choice list 8: to the sooner boundary, for the higher stake 
Problem 











20 WEEKS + 
1 Day 
(euro) 
1 240.00 0.00 80.00 80.00  
2 227.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.52 
3 215.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.57 
4 209.60 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.60 
5 204.40 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.63 
6 199.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.66 
7 194.40 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.69 
8 189.60 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.71 
9 185.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.75 
10 180.80 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.78 
11 176.80 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.81 
12 172.80 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.85 
13 168.80 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.88 
14 165.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.92 
15 161.60 0.00 80.00 80.00 0.96 
16 158.40 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.00 
17 155.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.04 
18 152.00 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.09 
19 149.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.13 
20 146.40 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.18 
21 143.60 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.23 
22 138.40 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.31 
23 136.00 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.40 
24 133.60 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.46 
25 129.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.55 
26 127.20 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.66 
27 121.60 0.00 80.00 80.00 1.80 
28 116.80 0.00 80.00 80.00 2.04 
29 96.00 0.00 80.00 80.00 3.31 




4 DOES MAKING A CHOICE AFFECT 
SUBSEQUENT BELIEF FORMATION? 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
In economic theories, when uncertainty is present, choices are based on beliefs 
and preferences. While substantial progress has been achieved in understanding 
how people make choices given their beliefs, economists have paid less attention 
to the question in the opposite direction: does making a choice have an effect on 
subsequent belief formation?  
One example would be John choosing his dessert. Does choosing yoghurt over 
ice cream make John believe in a larger health benefit of yoghurt relative to ice 
cream? This could happen either because believing that brings a higher 
anticipatory utility (e.g. yoghurt brings less risk of obesity in the future) or 
because believing that raises self-esteem (e.g. John made a correct choice).  
This possibility has important implications in both positive and normative 
terms. If making a choice shifts the decision maker’s belief more in favor of the 
chosen option, it may lead to persistence of early-stage beliefs and behaviors. 
When such persistence exists, beliefs do not necessarily converge to the truth. In 
the example of John, if choosing yoghurt makes John believe in a larger benefit 
of yoghurt, he is more likely to choose yoghurt again. Choosing yoghurt 
repeatedly makes John’s belief continually shift in favor of yoghurt. Then even if 
the truth is that the health benefit of yoghurt is not large enough to overweight its 
disadvantage in deliciousness, his belief might converge to one that supports the 
choice of yoghurt. In this case, intervention programs that change behaviors in 
the short-run have a long-run effect on beliefs, and thus can be used to induce 
desired beliefs and behaviors in the long-run. Such an intervention program is 
justified when John has inconsistent preferences: the Cold self (i.e. the self when 
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the temptation is absent) is more patient than the Hot self (i.e. the self when the 
temptation is present) but has no direct control over choices (Bernheim and 
Rangel 2004). If an intervention program is available, the Cold self is willing to 
participate in order to induce a long-run belief that supports the choice of yoghurt.  
In this paper, we perform an experiment to investigate whether making a choice 
has a direct effect on subsequent belief formation. To be more specific, we are 
interested in whether making a choice, compared to not making a choice, leads 
to any difference in future beliefs about the attractiveness of the options, due to 
some cognitive biases.  
The effect should not be confused with the following two information effects 
which often occur before or after a choice is made. First, if a decision maker is 
asked to make a choice, she might put more effort into collecting information, 
which could lead to a different belief from that if she does not need to make a 
choice (the information-collection effect). Second, after a choice is made, the 
decision maker might receive some feedback from consuming the chosen option, 
which brings her additional information than if she does not make a choice (the 
feedback effect). Those two effects could be explained by Bayesian learning, and 
hence are not our focus. We rule them out in our experimental design.  
Our study is related to but different from two strands of literature. First, there 
are studies on choice-induced preference change. They find evidence that the act 
of choosing a good (Brehm 1956), waiting for a good (Aronson and Carlsmith 
1963), participating in an activity (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959; Aronson and 
Mills 1959; Gerard and Matthewson 1966), writing an essay to support a group 
of people (Cohen 1962), or voting for a candidate (Mullainathan and Washington 
2009) leads to a more favorable opinion of the corresponding good, activity or 
person in the future (see Cooper 2007 for a review). Preferences over alternatives 
can be divided into beliefs about attributes of alternatives and preferences over 
lotteries of attributes. For instance, preferences over ice cream and yoghurt can 




options, and preferences over lotteries of deliciousness and health consequences. 
In this sense, our study can be seen as an investigation into the effect on the first 
part when the second part is controlled. Moreover, because preferences over 
goods, activities, groups of people or candidates are not verifiable, it is not 
possible to incentivize reported preferences directly. In contrast, we elicit beliefs 
about verifiable objects, and hence by incentivizing belief elicitation, we can 
examine whether making a choice has economically meaningful effects on future 
beliefs.  
Second, a few studies investigate whether having a stake in some states of 
nature induces people to distort their beliefs. Studies on beliefs about self-
relevant events, such as one’s own cognitive ability or beauty, usually find 
evidence of distortion (Eil and Rao 2011, Ertac 2011 and Möbius et al. 2014), but 
studies on beliefs about objective events, such as color of a ball or weather, find 
mixed evidence (Ertac 2011, Barron 2018, Heger and Papageorge 2018 and the 
medium- and the high-incentive treatments of Coutts 2015 find no distortion, but 
Mayraz 2014 and the low-incentive treatment of Coutts 2015 find evidence of 
distortion). In those studies, what states of nature bring higher payoffs is 
exogenous to subjects’ beliefs. In contrast, we are interested in whether beliefs 
are distorted when people voluntarily bet on states of nature. Whether one’s bet 
is correct is somehow self-relevant, and hence beliefs are a priori more likely to 
be distorted in this case. This has potential implication to policies: an intervention 
program that induces people to choose a target behavior by their own might be 
more effective than one that forces people to perform the target behavior.  
Our experiment consists of two stages. In Stage 1, subjects are presented with 
noisy signals about the values of two options, and then they are randomly 
assigned to one of the three treatments: making a choice between the two options, 
receiving a random option, or possessing no option. In Stage 2, subjects are 
presented with more signals and are asked to estimate the values of the two 
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options. We examine whether making a choice in Stage 1 leads to a systematic 
change in reported beliefs in Stage 2.  
We consider choice-induced belief change as a result of interaction between 
different psychological motives. People, on the one hand, want to form an 
accurate belief about values of options for potential uses in the future, and on the 
other hand, distort beliefs in order to derive a higher anticipatory utility or to raise 
self-esteem. Thereby, we expect that beliefs are more likely to be distorted when 
the incentive for accuracy is lower. Back to the example of John, he is less likely 
to admit the health risk of ice cream if it is a special hand-made product which 
will no longer appear in his life, because the information about health 
consequences will not be used any more, and hence he would rather think in a 
comfortable way. In our experiment, in some of the sessions, belief elicitation is 
incentivized while in the other sessions it is not. By comparing the results 
between those sessions, we can examine how choice-induced belief change is 
affected by the relative importance of accuracy.  
We consider two potential channels of choice-induced belief change. 
Distortion can take place either in the retrieval of pre-choice signals (e.g. John’s 
record of diet and weight), or in the processing of post-choice signals (e.g. 
magazine articles about over-eating). We thus vary the accessibility of pre-choice 
signals in the post-choice stage in our experiment to examine whether belief 
change can take place when the retrieval of pre-choice signals cannot be distorted.  
Our design has three advantages. First, it rules out the selection bias caused by 
the inherent correlation between choices and beliefs, a problem that was not well 
dealt with in some previous studies (see Chen and Risen 2010 and Alós-Ferrer 
and Shi 2015 for detailed introductions). Since whether a subject is invited to 
make a choice in Stage 1 is exogenous, the study provides a clean test of choice-
induced belief change. Second, belief elicitation can be incentivized in our design, 
which allows us to examine whether making a choice has an effect on belief 




accessibility of pre-choice signals in the post-choice stage. As a result, we can 
test if belief change is possible when people have perfect accessibility to their 
pre-choice signals.  
We find no significant differences between the distributions of estimates in the 
three groups, irrespective of whether belief elicitation is incentivized or not, and 
irrespective of whether pre-choice signals are perfectly accessible or not. The 
results suggest that in a setting where beliefs are about a single, immediately 
verifiable attribute, making a choice does not lead to an economically meaningful 
effect on subsequent belief formation.  
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 4.1 we 
introduce the theoretical background of choice-induced belief change. In Section 
4.2, we present our experimental design, testing procedure and testable 
hypotheses. We show our results in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we discuss how 
our results are related to the literature, and draw conclusions.  
 
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
We consider a two-stage situation. In Stage 1, a decision maker (henceforth 
DM) needs to choose between two options. She does not observe the exact values 
of the two options but can observe some signals. She tries her best to interpret the 
signals, with some noise due to cognitive limitations, and makes a choice based 
on her interpretation of the signals. In Stage 2, she needs to form a belief, for 
instance, in order to make another decision or to give a recommendation to others. 
At this time, she can observe her past choice, recall her pre-choice signals 
(perfectly or imperfectly) and also receive some new signals. For simplicity, we 
assume that the goal of Stage 2 generates a symmetric and single-mode incentive, 
so that, if there is no cognitive bias, forming an unbiased and accurate belief is 
the best to the DM.  
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However, the DM might have psychological motives other than maintaining 
an accurate belief, which could generate a bias in her belief. One such motive is 
wishful thinking: if the DM can get a higher payoff conditional on one option 
(e.g. Option A) having a higher value than the other (e.g. Option B), she will 
overestimate the value of Option A relative to Option B in order to obtain a larger 
anticipatory utility (Loewinstein 1987). Such a differential payoff could be 
caused by an exogenous event (e.g. she is given a random option) or by the DM’s 
choice (e.g. she chooses an option).  
Besides wishful thinking, the DM may also have motives that exist only if she 
has made a choice. First, she may have a motive to reduce cognitive dissonance, 
a tendency to deny her responsibility for possible bad consequences of a past 
choice, either by arguing that her choice was at least optimal conditional on her 
pre-choice signals or by arguing that her choice will turn out to be correct 
(Festinger 1957; see Cooper 2007 for a review). Second, she may have a motive 
of self-perception, a tendency to infer forgotten pre-choice signals from her 
choice (Bem 1965 and 1972). Both the motives could prompt the DM to shift her 
belief towards her choice.  
Since belief change is a result of a tradeoff between the utility of accuracy and 
the anticipatory utility, the size of the effect is affected by the importance of 
accuracy (Brunnermeier and Parker 2005). If the post-choice belief is not 
consequential, the motive to maintain an accurate belief becomes weaker. In this 
case, we are more likely to observe a belief change.  
There are two potential channels of belief change. The DM can either distort 
the retrieval of pre-choice signals or distort the processing of post-choice signals. 
If pre-choice signals are perfectly accessible in Stage 2, the channel of distorting 
pre-choice signals is no longer possible. In this case, any belief change must be 
caused by biased processing of post-choice signals.  
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4.2 Experimental Design and Analysis 
4.2.1 Design 
There are two stages in our experiment. Subjects are first given the instructions 
for Stage 1. After they finish Stage 1, the instructions for Stage 2 are delivered. 
The instructions are read aloud before either stage of the experiment.  
In Stage 1, subjects are given two unknown numbers (called X and Y) and are 
asked to judge which number is larger. They cannot see the true values of the two 
numbers but can generate signals by clicking buttons (Figure 4.1). Subjects are 
informed that signals are independent, equally likely to be larger or smaller than 
the true value, and more likely to be close to than far away from the true value. 
They are also given a graph showing the probabilities of a signal deviating from 
the true value to a certain extent.  
In fact, the true values of the two numbers are one of the following four pairs: 
(115, 120), (160, 165), (137, 142) and (182, 187). It is randomly determined 
whether X or Y is larger. Signals are independent and normally distributed around 
the true values, with a standard deviation of 30, and are censored when the 
deviation is above 100. Since the difference between X and Y is only five, signals 
are quite noisy. Consequently, subjects will face large uncertainty in the values of 
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Subjects can generate as many signals as they want within two minutes, with a 
minimum delay of one second between every two signals. Signals stay on the 
screen until time is over. After that, all signals disappear. Then subjects are 
randomly assigned to one of the following three treatments. In the Choice group, 
subjects need to choose the larger of the two numbers. If a subject makes a correct 
choice, she will get eight euros; otherwise she will get nothing. In the Gift group, 
each subject is randomly given one of the two numbers. If the given number is 
the larger one, she will get eight euros; otherwise she will get nothing. In the 
Neutral group, subjects are not assigned to any of the two numbers and each of 
them will get four euros. Subjects in the Choice group have 30 seconds for 
making a choice. If one does not make a choice in time, the computer makes a 
random choice for her.  
When subjects generate signals, they have no idea about which treatment they 
will be assigned to, though they are aware of the three possibilities. In this way, 
the information-collection effect is ruled out.  
Since the three treatments are randomly assigned, whether one needs to make 
a choice is exogenous to her belief. Therefore, by comparing the beliefs in the 
Choice group with those in the Neutral group, we can test whether there exists a 
choice-induced belief change.  
In the Gift group, subjects are randomly assigned to X or Y. Thereby, by 
looking at the difference in reported beliefs between those who are assigned to 
the larger number and those who are assigned to the smaller number, we can test 
whether there is a stake-induced belief distortion in our setting.  
Subjects do not know immediately after Stage 1 whether their choice or the 
number they are given is the larger number. In fact, they cannot see the true values 
of X and Y until Stage 2 is over. This implies that making a choice in Stage 1 
does not bring more information about the two numbers, and as a result, the 
feedback effect is ruled out. 
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In Stage 2, subjects are asked to report their estimates of X and Y, of which the 
values are the same as in Stage 1. Subjects can generate signals again, but this 
time, for each of the two numbers, only the latest signal remains on the screen 
(see Figure 4.2, above the two white buttons). We restrict the accessibility to 
signals generated in Stage 2 in order to maximize the room for distorting beliefs.  
In the middle of the screen, subjects are provided with the information about 
their group. Besides, subjects in the Choice group are reminded of their choices 
made in Stage 1, and subjects in the Gift group are reminded of the numbers 
assigned to them in Stage 1.  
Except the information about the latest signals generated in Stage 2 and the 
group in Stage 1, subjects may or may not see all the signals generated in Stage 
1, depending on which condition they are under. Under the Main condition, 
signals generated in Stage 1 are not displayed in Stage 2 (Figure 4.2(a)). Under 
the Archive condition, all signals generated in Stage 1 are displayed on the screen 
(Figure 4.2(b)). Given that subjects have perfect accessibility to pre-choice 
signals and enough time to process, the channel of distorting the retrieval of pre-
choice signals is no longer possible.  
With all the information mentioned above, subjects are asked to report their 
estimates of both X and Y. The time limit for generating new signals and reporting 
beliefs is five minutes. Those who fail to submit beliefs in time get no reward 
from Stage 2.  
Under both the Main condition and the Archive condition, we incentivize their 
reported beliefs with the quadratic scoring rule. The relation between one’s 
earnings from the reported belief, 𝑚, and the absolute deviation, 𝑑, is 
𝑚 = max(8 − 0.02 × 𝑑2, 0)  euros. 
With the incentive structure above, subjects are incentivized to report the 
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We also implement a No-Incentive condition, in which all features are the same 
as in the Main condition except that the reward does not depend on the reported 
beliefs but are fixed at four euros. It enables us to check if belief change is more 
likely to occur when the reported belief is not consequential.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the features of the three between-subject conditions and 
what motives could play a role for subjects in the Choice group under the three 
conditions, respectively.  
Table 4.1: Conditions at the Session Level and Implications to the Choice Group 
 
In our experiment, all subjects get three euros as a show-up fee. Besides, each 
subject is paid either for her earnings from Stage 1 or for her earnings from Stage 
2. Which stage is paid is determined randomly at the end of the experiment. The 
random incentive scheme rules out the motivation of hedging.  
4.2.2 Testing Procedure and Hypotheses 
A difficulty in identifying any choice-induced effect is the inherent 
endogeneity in choices: subjects who believe X is larger in Stage 1 choose X, and 
they are more likely to believe X is larger in Stage 2 as well. Thereby a correlation 
between choosing X and reporting a larger estimate of X does not necessarily 
 Main Archive No-Incentive 
Incentivized? yes yes no 
Stage 1 signals displayed in Stage 2? no yes no 
Implications to the Choice group 
Maintaining accurate beliefs Strong Strong Weak 
Distorting the retrieval of Stage 1 
signals 
Possible Not possible Possible 
Distorting the processing of Stage 2 
signals 
Possible Possible Possible 
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mean a causal effect of choices on beliefs. Chen and Risen (2010) and Alós-Ferrer 
and Shi (2015) show that many previous studies used testing procedures with 
statistical biases, either because they did not correct for the endogeneity, or they 
corrected in an inappropriate way.  
In this paper, we develop a new approach to test the existence of a choice-
induced belief change. The approach is based on the following idea: people who 
believe in Stage 2 that X is larger are more likely to believe in the same relation 
between X and Y in Stage 1 than believing in the opposite relation. Therefore, 
when those people are in the Choice group, they are more likely to have chosen 
X than having chosen Y. If making a choice makes one’s belief more favorable to 
her choice, the people mentioned above (i.e. those who believe that X is larger in 
Stage 2) will on average have a belief more favorable to X, compared to their 
counterparts in the Neutral group. Similarly, people in the Neutral group who 
believe that Y is larger would have beliefs more favorable to Y were they in the 
Choice group. As a result, the distribution in the Choice group should be more 
spread out than that in the Neutral group. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the idea 
graphically. Here, 𝐿 is one’s reported belief on the truly larger number and 𝑆 is 
her reported belief on the truly smaller number. Figure 4.3(a) shows that, for 
subjects with 𝐿 − S > 0 , the average effect of making a choice on 𝐿 − S is 
positive; for subjects with 𝐿 − S < 0, the average effect of making a choice on 
𝐿 − S is negative. Figure 4.3(b) shows the simulated distributions of beliefs on 
𝐿 − S in the Choice group and in the Neutral group: the distribution in the Choice 
group is more spread out than that in the Neutral group.31   
 
                                                        
31 The simulation assumes the following model. Subjects receive a certain number of signals in Stage 
1 and in Stage 2. Each signal is an independent and normally distributed random variable. Subjects form 
beliefs and make choices rationally. Making a choice shifts one’s belief towards her choice by a fixed 
number of units. All parameters are calibrated to our sample statistics under the Main condition.  




(a) Average effect of making a choice conditional on a belief 
 
(b) Simulated distributions of beliefs in the Choice group and in the Neutral group 
Figure 4.3: Simulated Effect of Making a Choice on the Distribution of Beliefs 
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Based on the idea above, we test the choice-induced belief change by 
performing a rank-sum test on the absolute belief differences over the two 
numbers between the Choice group and the Neutral group, i.e. we test the equality 
of |𝐿 − 𝑆| between the Choice group and the Neutral group. If making a choice 
does not change one’s belief, the absolute difference should be the same in the 
two groups. However, if a choice-induced belief change occurs, the absolute 
difference is supposed to be larger in the Choice group than in the Neutral group.  
Based on the testing procedure above and our experimental design, we propose 
three hypotheses about choice-induced belief change. First, we test if making a 
choice leads to a belief change in a situation where the belief elicitation is 
incentivized and pre-choice signals are unavailable in the stage of belief 
formation. In this case, the channel of distorting the retrieval of pre-choice signals 
and that of distorting the processing of post-choice signals are both possible.  
Hypothesis 1 (Choice-induced belief change when pre-choice signals are 
imperfectly accessible): Under the Main condition, |𝐿 − 𝑆| in the Choice group 
is larger than that in the Neutral group.  
We are also interested in the question whether making a choice results in a 
belief change when pre-choice signals are perfectly accessible. In this case, the 
only possible channel is to distort the processing of post-choice signals.  
Hypothesis 2 (Choice-induced belief change when pre-choice signals are 
perfectly accessible): Under the Archive condition, |𝐿 − 𝑆| in the Choice group 
is larger than that in the Neutral group.  
When a reported belief is not consequential, the motive to maintain an accurate 
belief is weaker. We wonder if we can detect a belief change in this case, so we 




Hypothesis 3 (Choice-induced belief change when belief elicitation is not 
incentivized): Under the No-Incentive condition, |𝐿 − 𝑆| in the Choice group is 
larger than that in the Neutral group.  
To facilitate a comparison between the choice-induced belief change and the 
stake-induced belief distortion, we test if there is a belief distortion when a subject 
does not make a choice but is given a random option. For this purpose, we check 
if people who are randomly assigned to the larger number have a larger belief 
difference, 𝐿 − 𝑆, than those who are assigned to the smaller number.32  
Hypothesis 4 (Stake-induced belief distortion): In any condition, people who 
are assigned to the larger number report a larger estimate of 𝐿 − 𝑆 than those 
who are assigned to the smaller number.  
4.2.3 Implementation 
Our experiment was conducted at the CentERlab, Tilburg University from 
March to September in 2016. 360 students of the university participated in one of 
the 26 sessions, 142 under the Main condition, 114 under the Archive condition 
and 104 under the No-Incentive condition. One session took 35 minutes on 
average. The average earning was €7.90.  
4.3 Results 
In Stage 1, we randomly assigned subjects to three treatments. 121 subjects 
were allocated into the Neutral Group, 118 into the Gift Group, and 121 into the 
Choice Group. Among those who were allocated into the Choice Group, five 
                                                        
32 It is impossible to test whether choice-induced belief change is of a larger size at the individual level 
than stake-induced belief change by comparing L-S between the Choice group and the Gift group, because 
under the null hypothesis that the effects have the same size, the distribution of L-S in the Choice group 
spreads out from 0 while that in the Gift group spreads out from 5, which is the true value of L-S. Thereby, 
the medians of |L-S| in the two groups are different under the null hypothesis. 
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failed to make a choice within the time limit, then they were randomly given an 
option, and we hereby count them as in the Gift Group.  
We drop a few observations which are not useful to our analysis. First, 21 
subjects failed to submit their beliefs within the time limit. Second, five subjects 
failed to make a choice within the time limit. Third, 12 subjects reported beliefs 
which are out of the potential range of their signals (i.e. the difference between 
the reported belief and the true value is greater than 100). Those beliefs are 
obviously ungrounded. Fourth, two subjects requested fewer than five signals for 
one of the numbers in the entire experiment, which makes their reported beliefs 
unreliable.33 Those four problems involve 33 subjects in total, and we hereby 
drop those observations.  
Table 4.2 shows the number of remaining observations in each group and under 
each condition along with statistics about the numbers of signals requested. There 
are no significant differences in the number of signals requested in Stage 2 
between the three groups, showing that whether one makes a choice or has a stake 
in an option does not affect signal-requesting behavior.  
23 out of the 107 subjects (21%) in the Choice group chooses the smaller 
underlying number, showing that finding out the larger underlying number is not 
straightforward.34 This implies that subjects face non-trivial uncertainty in the 
values of X and Y, which could provide excuses for subjects to distort their beliefs.  
Figure 4.4 shows the comparison of absolute belief differences between the 
Neutral group and the Choice group. We perform rank-sum tests on those 
differences. Table 4.3 shows the results. Under no condition is the absolute belief 
difference significantly larger for the Choice group than for the Neutral group 
(p>0.10 for all conditions, one-sided). This implies that making a choice in Stage 
1 does not have an effect on belief formation in Stage 2. The result holds 
                                                        
33 We check the robustness of our results by including those who requested too few signals. No 
conclusion changes.  
34 The fraction is not very small, given the fact that the fraction would be 50% if all subjects chose 
randomly. The task being not straightforward is also shown by the following fact: the sample standard 




irrespective of whether belief elicitation is incentivized or not, and irrespective 
of whether Stage 1 signals are perfectly accessible in Stage 2. This suggests that 
making a choice does not lead to any belief change in our setting, neither due to 
wishful thinking nor due to any choice-related motives.  
Table 4.2: Number of Observations and Statistics in Each Group and under Each Condition 
Notes: Number of observations, mean and standard deviation of number of signals 
requested in Stage 2, under each condition and in each treatment group.  
 
Condition Group # 
obs 




Wallis test of 
equality 
Main 
Neutral 42 134.6 [52.2]  
p = 0.498 Gift 42 119.4 [62.0] 
Choice 44 121.8 [54.3] 
Archive 
Neutral 33 73.6 [40.1] 
p = 0.186 Gift 35 81.2 [36.9] 
Choice 30 91.5 [44.0] 
No-Incentive 
Neutral 36 87.0 [43.5] 
p = 0.974 Gift 32 85.7 [50.2] 
Choice 33 85.7 [37.0] 




Figure 4.4: Distributions of Absolute Belief Differences in the Neutral Group and in 
the Choice Group 
Notes: Mean absolute belief difference, |𝐿 − 𝑆|. For each box, the horizontal lines 
from top to bottom are the upper adjacent value, the 3rd quartile, the median, the 1st 
quartile and the lower adjacent value, respectively. Observations outside the adjacent 
values are dropped from the figure.  
Table 4.3: Tests of Choice-Induced Belief Change 
Notes: A mean absolute belief difference is the mean of the absolute differences 
between the belief on X and that on Y. This table presents the one-sided rank-sum 
tests on the mean absolute belief differences between the Neutral group and the 
Choice group under the three conditions.  
 Main Archive No-Incentive 
Mean absolute belief 
difference in the Neutral 
Group |𝐷0| = |𝐿 − 𝑆|0 
13.14 14.15 14.94 
Mean absolute belief 
difference in the Choice 
Group |𝐷𝐶| = |𝐿 − 𝑆|𝐶  
10.68 11.00 18.61 
Rank-sum test 
𝐻0: |𝐷0| = |𝐷𝐶| 
𝐻1: |𝐷0| < |𝐷𝐶| 




Figure 4.5 shows the comparison of the belief differences between those who 
are given the larger number and those who are given the smaller number. We 
report the results of the rank-sum tests on the belief differences in Table 4.4. 
Under no condition are the belief differences significantly larger for those who 
are given the larger number as a gift than for those who are given the smaller 
number (p>0.10 for all conditions, two-sided).35 Therefore, we find no evidence 
of stake-induce belief distortion.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Mean Belief Differences among Those Who are Given the Larger 
Number and Those Who are Given the Smaller Number 
Notes: Mean belief difference, 𝐿 − 𝑆. For each box, the horizontal lines from top to 
bottom are the upper adjacent value, the 3rd quartile, the median, the 1st quartile and 
the lower adjacent value, respectively. Observations outside the adjacent values are 
dropped from the figure.  
                                                        
35 There is, however, a trend under the Main condition and the No-Incentive condition that people who 
are given the larger number report a smaller belief difference than those who are given the smaller number. 
The reason is not likely to be hedging, not only because in theory the random incentive scheme can rule 
out hedging, but also because the difference is of a larger size under the No-Incentive condition where 
belief elicitation does not affect monetary payoffs. A possible reason is distrust about the randomness of 
the given option, that is, subjects may believe that they are more likely to receive the smaller number. This 
effect is much weaker under the Archive condition where all pre-choice signals are available again.  
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Table 4.4: Tests of Stake-Induced Belief Distortion 
Notes: A mean belief difference is the mean of the differences between the belief on 
the truly larger number and that on the truly smaller number. This table presents the 
two-sided rank-sum tests on the mean belief differences between subjects who 
receive the truly larger number and those who receive the truly smaller number under 
the three conditions.  
In order to determine whether the null results are due to lack of power, we 
calculate the ex-ante power of our tests on choice-induced belief changes. To do 
so, we assume that a subject perceives signals received in the two stages as two 
independent and normally distributed random variables, of which the precisions 
are proportional to the number of signals requested in the corresponding stage. 
We then calibrate the parameters with the aggregate characteristics of our data. 
Specifically, we set the number of signals in each stage in the power analysis to 
be the median number of signals in the corresponding stage in our data, and set 
the total precision of signals to be the reciprocal of the sample variance of the 
belief difference in the Neutral Group.  
Table 4.5 shows the results of the power analysis. If there is an effect which 
leads to a loss equivalent to 9% of the maximum reward in belief elicitation, our 
test has a chance of 85-88% at the 5% level and 92-94% at the 10% level to reject 
the null hypothesis. This shows that our test is able to detect economically 
meaningful effects.  
 Main Archive No-Incentive 
Mean belief difference 
among those who receive 
the larger number as a gift 
𝐷𝐺𝐿 = (𝐿 − 𝑆)𝐺𝐿 
4.36 11.57 -1.07 
Mean belief difference 
among those who receive 
the smaller number as a gift 
𝐷𝐺𝑆 = (𝐿 − 𝑆)𝐺𝑆 
9.20 10.36 10.71 
Rank-sum test 
𝐻0: 𝐷𝐺𝐿 = 𝐷𝐺𝑆 
𝐻1: 𝐷𝐺𝐿 ≠ 𝐷𝐺𝑆  
p = 0.203 p = 0.761  p = 0.130 
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Table 4.5: Rejection Rates with Different Effect Sizes 
 
4.4 Conclusion and Discussions 
In this paper, we examine the effect of making a choice on subsequent belief 
formation. Regardless of whether belief elicitation is incentivized or not, we find 
no evidence for a belief change, despite of the sufficient power of our test to 
detect a non-trivial effect. This suggests that making a choice does not lead to an 
economically meaningful belief change in our setting. We do not detect a stake-
induced belief distortion, either. This suggests that wishful thinking does not 
drive an optimism bias in our setting.  
Our results on state-induced belief distortion are consistent with some previous 
studies (Barron 2018; Heger and Papageorge 2018; the medium- and high-
incentive group of Coutts 2018), but are different from findings of some other 
studies (Mayraz 2014; and the low-incentive group of Coutts 2018). We consider 
two possible reasons for the difference. First, the ratio of the stake in a good state 
to the incentive for belief elicitation might matter. The low-incentive group of 
Coutts (2018) has a ratio of 26.7, which is much higher than 8 in the medium-
incentive group, 4 in the low-incentive group, 4.95 in Barron (2018) and one in 
Heger and Papageorge (2018). A higher ratio implies greater importance of 
anticipatory utility relative to accuracy, which induces people to make a larger 




























8 4% 0.50 0.64 0.53 0.67 0.52 0.66 
10 6.25% 0.69 0.81 0.74 0.84 0.71 0.82 
12 9% 0.85 0.92 0.88 0.94 0.86 0.93 
14 12.25% 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.96 0.98 
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distortion. Second, the salience of distortion may also be affected by whether the 
event about which beliefs are formed is immediately verifiable. Mayraz (2014) 
asks subjects to predict asset prices in one month. In that case, the event is not 
verifiable when subjects report their beliefs, and hence subjects could have less 
fear of negative evaluation from the experimenter (Watson and Friend 1969; see 
Trautmann et al. 2008 for an application in ambiguity aversion). This implies a 
smaller mental cost for subjects to distort their beliefs.  
Our results can also be compared to the literature of cognitive dissonance. Most 
studies on cognitive dissonance provide evidence of choice-induced preference 
change, while our study does not find support for choice-induced belief change. 
One reason for the gap could be that preferences are always private information 
and thus cannot be directly verified. As discussed above, unverifiability makes 
preferences more likely to be distorted. The discrepancy can also arise from the 
difference between beliefs over attributes and preferences over alternatives. As 
mentioned in the introduction, preferences over alternatives can be divided into 
two parts: beliefs over attributes and preferences over lotteries of attributes. When 
more than one attribute is involved, it is possible that making a choice changes 
the relative importance of different attributes (e.g. health benefits become more 
important relative to deliciousness) but does not change beliefs about any 
attribute (e.g. beliefs about health benefits and deliciousness of all dessert options 
keep constant), and thereby the person displays a choice-induced preference 
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